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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/App

Priorit

v.
Case No. 980169-CA

MICHAEL RENE DITTMER,
Defendant/Appellant

B fl I E F O F I P PEL I E E

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal Imui u m \ iiniinr. Im huigLus. <i IIIIIMI degree1 fiinih

ii! ml iimn

of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1995); Theft, a class B Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-41 I I I yw> I, possessioi i • : f a coi ltrolled si lbstai ice, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1996); and possession of
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanoi ii: :t 'iolatioi I :)f I Jtal I Code « \ i in: i § 58 37 A,-5( 1)
(1996). This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)
(1996).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
111 Di dlli tii i a l :• cin insel ef f e i;:tii \ ; elj • i ep i esent defendant :
Defendant's claim of ineffective assistance is raised for the first time on appeal;
therefore, Ihc I ourl r e s o l d lln "*.."

ll

t\^ MMIIII 1

iMm "' '.i//. i P n t ( \ MI IM p .^j '!S<)9

264 (Utah App. 1995), cert, denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996). However, appellate
review of counsel's performance iiiml l-i I * LI X L iciili ml « tlicrvu. c, (In ih^t«»rting

effects of hindsight' would produce too great a temptation for courts to second-guess trial
counsel's performance on the basis of an inanimate record." State v. Callahan, 866 P.2d
590, 593 (Utah App. 1993) (citation omitted).
In claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show that trial
counsel's performance was deficient, in that it "'fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.'" Price, 909 P.2d at 264 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 688 (1984)). "[Defendant must also show that trial counsel's performance was
prejudicial by proffering sufficient evidence demonstrating 'a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.'" Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). If it is easier to dispose of claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel on this second, prejudice prong, the Court may do so
without reaching the adequacy of trial counsel's performance. Id.
2. Was the prosecutor's conduct proper?
In determining whether a prosecutor's remarks are improper and erroneous, an
appellate court considers whether the remarks "called to the jurors' attention matters
which they wold not be justified in considering in reaching a verdict." State v. Palmer,
860 P.2d 339, 342 (Utah App.) (quotation omitted), cert, denied, 868 P.2d 95 (Utah
1993). "Failure to object to the improper remarks, however, waives the claim unless the
remarks reach the level of plain error." Id. Plain error is established only if an error
exists, it should have been obvious to the trial court, and it was also harmful. Id. An
error is harmful only if there is a reasonable likelihood that absent the error, the outcome
would have been more favorable. Id.

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . ..
the Assistance of counsel for his defense.
U.S. Const. Amend. VI.
• . Aii\ ulliei n In ' nil u»i! ililiilLiiu.il |uth isioii, sl.ilul

m ink i- i ilnl is pnlmi'iill ini

the body of the brief.
! »ll A I FIMIN I Ul' II I I II", "I ASE •
Defendant was charged with burglary, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. \ '< iv^L1" l IlJIJ >» il|h I1. ,i i U * H niiMkiik\Hi'>

xuAA^^n "f l 'lib Cink

Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995); possession of controlled substance (marijuana), in violation of
Utah Code Ann. §58-3 7-8 (1996); ai id possession of dr ug paraphernalia, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37A-5(l) (1996) (R. 1-5). Following
a jury trial conducted
104-07). The trial court imposed the statutory term of from zero-to-five years for the
felony offense and the stati itoi > tei i i l c f si: <»:: i i IOI it'll: is for eacl: I :::)f the n: lisdei i: leai lor offenses,
all terms to be served concurrently (R. 114-15).
Si VI f Ml P\l II I'll1 I III II1 "Ml I S

' .

The facts are stated in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Dunn,
850 IJ. 1 d 1 J ' 11 1 1 1 1 ' ' i'» 11" I' I 11 1 "l'

i i"'" " ^ M i " 11 'I'"'' -1 s< l',J| 11.»»I v \ u«r^, H k 11 n I 1 i

storage shed located at Mollerup Storage in Riverdale, Utah (R. 128: 56-57).1 Nicole

^ h e transcript volumes only are stamped with a record number, R. 128 and R.
129, respectively, and the internal pages are not; therefore, citation to the transcript will
be first to the pertinent record volume and then to the to the specific transcript page.

3

kept in the shed, including a couch, bed frame, and day planner (R. 128: 58-64). While
Nicole was at the shed she noticed that all of her things were intact, and that nothing was
missing (R. 128: 63). Nicole carefully locked the shed and checked to make sure it was
secure when she left (R. 128: 60-61). Nicole was current on her rent to Mollerup and
there was no reason that Mollerup would have "tampered" with her storage shed (R. 128:
67,119).
At approximately 5:45 p.m. on 29 March 1998, Solomon Le Doux, arrived at
Mollerup Storage to check on his own storage sheds as they had been burgled one week
earlier (R. 129: 5; R. 128: 3-4,12). Le Doux had been overdue on his rent to Mollerup
in the past (R. 128: 9). It was his experience that when rent was overdue, Mollerup put a
lock on the storage shed until the rent was paid (R. 128: 9).2
Upon arriving at Mollerup on 29 March 1998, Le Doux saw defendant and
codefendant going through the storage sheds (R. 128: 4). Defendant appeared "anxious"
and was keeping "lookout" while codefendant removed items from the sheds and placed
them in an old green truck (R. 128: 5). In particular, Le Doux noticed that a couch had
been pulled out of one of the storage sheds (R. 128: 6-7). Suspicious about this activity,
Le Doux called the police (R. 128: 18).
Officer Hackworth of the Roy City Police Department, arrived to investigate
approximately 15 minutes later at 6:00 p.m. (R. 128: 18). The officer approached and

2

Tracy Timmons, a secretary at Mollerup Storage clarified that if a customer gets
behind in rent by four months, Mollerup's policy is to notify the customer that they will
be locked out of their storage shed (R. 128: 119). If the customer does not respond to the
lockout notice, they are sent a "sales" letter (id.). If the customer does not respond to this
second notice, the case is referred to the manager (id.).
4

spoke to defendant who was standing next to a green pickup truck that was completely
loaded with property; and '

"L i" ' i1

"v I « i null >\\A\I\ ' " l l,n

,iinl

''< ' '^ "^i- '! "

Officer Hackworth asked defendant if the truck belonged to him and defendant responded
affirmatively (R, UK J" I I I lie MIIILM IIIIIIIU iiiquiivd ill defendaiil was alone

i ill

someone was with him, and defendant said that he was with codefendant (R. 128: 23).
Officer Hackworth asked for defendan
falsely replied that his name was Mike Bradshaw and that his birthdate was 10 April 1964

Mollerup and defendant claimed that he did and showed the officer storage shed #665 (R.
128: 25). At this time, Officer Hackv 'oi (:t 1 1 loticed codefei iclant coi i lii :ig oi it of ai lotl iei
storage shed approximately five units away, carrying an armful of books. The officer
ordered codefendant out of the shed and, Un saleh reasons, a,ska! ' '"'i

i "'

L ;•

outside the storage building while waiting for a backup officer to arrive (R. 128: 30).
While waiting for assistance, Office i

;

.

•:. V ±r *

if they had been going through storage sheds which were rented by other individuals.
Defendant answered ihat ihe\ had been going through ""IIIIIIH kctl111 sn>iage sheds luokmg
for items to sell at a swap meet (R. 128:

Officer Hackworth asked defendant what

they had found, and codefendant respo

1:1 :t€ y 1 ladfo^n id a coi id l, a vv as! ling

machine and a camper shell (R. 128: 34). Defendant added that the washing machine
and camper shell wcie inside In1. SUH age \\ivd i hi).
Officer Stephens arrived to assist at about this time (id). Officer Hackworth
continued speaking
35). Defendant said that he had been there three or four different times that day (id).

5

Officer Hackworth also asked where the property inside of defendant's truck had come
from (R. 128: 37). Defendant said it had been inside his truck for days, and that
everything in the back of the truck belonged to him (R. 128: 37, 39, 79-80).
During the conversation, Officer Hackworth was also attempting to confirm
defendant's name and date of birth (R. 128: 35). The officer informed defendant he had
not been able to find a record of his driver's license under the name and birthdate
defendant had provided and asked whether defendant in fact had a Utah driver's license
(id). Defendant said that he did, and that it should have shown up on the computer (R.
128: 36). Officer Hackworth told defendant that he did not feel defendant was giving
him correct information and defendant then revealed his correct name, Michael Rene
Dittmer, and his correct date of birth, 10 April 1961 (id.).
At this point, Lynette Talbot drove up and told the officers that she was looking for
her missing blue camper shell (R. 128: 38-39). Officer Stevens asked defendant if he had
a blue aluminum camper shell and defendant in turn inquired whether the officers wanted
to see the camper shell in his storage unit (R. 128: 38). Defendant then opened his
claimed storage shed and Talbot's missing camper shell and a washing machine were
inside (R. 128: 39).
Officer Hackworth asked if there was anything in the back of defendant's truck
which he had picked up from the storage sheds that day (R. 128: 38). Defendant
reiterated that "everything in the truck was his" (R. 128: 40). Defendant also volunteered
to let the officers look inside his truck and opened back of the truck for their inspection
(R. 128: 40, 49-50, 85, 151). As he did so, a day planner belonging to Nicole Ayers fell
out of the truck (R. 128: 86). Defendant claimed to have found the day planner in one of

6

the empty storage sheds (R. 128: 87). This was the first time that defendant disclaimed
any of the property located inside his truck (id).
Nicole subsequently arrived at the scene and identified the day planner, a bed
frame inside the truck and the couch on top of the truck as hers (R. 128: 89). Nicole also
noted that several other items were missing from her storage shed (id.). Following
Nicole's identification of the property, defendant and codefendant were placed under
arrest (R. 128: 90).
Pursuant to policy, the officers conducted an impound/inventory search of
defendant's truck (R. 128: 91,95). The property was removed from defendant's truck
and placed in piles for identification purposes (R. 128: 92). After photographing the
recovered property, Nicole was allowed to retrieve that portion of her property that was
not booked into evidence (R. 128: 97). The rest of the property was returned to
defendant's truck since police had identified no other owners and knew only that
defendant claimed the property was his (id.).
An inventory of the cab area of defendant's truck revealed on the seat in plain
view, a "hype kit" (R. 128: 44, 94).3 Upon discovering the "hype kit," Officer Stevens
walked over to Officer Hackworth's patrol car and showed it to him (R. 128: 44, 96).
Defendant was sitting inside (id.). Shortly thereafter, Officer Hackworth departed for the
jail with defendant and defendant volunteered that the "hype kit" was his and that he had
a drug problem (R. 128: 44).

3

A "hype kit" consists of equipment frequently used to mix drugs for intravenous
use(R. 128: 95).
7

Officer Hackworth also searched defendant's person and found marijuana in his
right front pocket (id).
Defendant was questioned at the station house by Detective Bryson (R. 128: 12425). Detective Bryson gave defendant his Miranda4 rights and defendant agreed to speak
with her (id.). Defendant admitted going into unlocked storage sheds at Mollerup and
taking property (R. 128: 126). He claimed that he thought the property was going to be
hauled off to the garbage (id.). When the detective asked him if he really thought the
washing machine was junk, defendant admitted that Min his heart he knew it was wrong to
take it and that he should return it" (R. 128: 129).
Defendant testified in his own defense (R. 128: 141-161) (a complete copy of
defendant's testimony is contained in addendum A). He claimed that upon arriving at
Mollerup on 29 March 1998, he noticed stuff all over the place and several open storage
sheds (R. 128: 144). He decided to take anything he could sell for a quarter or more at
the swap meet (R. 128: 145). He also planned to give some of the property to
codefendant (id.). Defendant claimed that while the couch was "pretty nice," he thought
the rest of the items would be thrown in the dumpster and were therefore "up for grabs"
(R. 128: 146-152). He returned later in the day with codefendant to get the couch he had
noticed earlier (R. 128: 147). Defendant explained that he gave Officer Hackworth a
false name because he was worried that there might be a DUI warrant out for him (R.
128: 150). He admitted telling the officer that most of the property in the truck belonged
to him and acknowledged that he consented to let the officers search in the back of his
truck (R. 128: 151). On cross examination, defendant admitted that the hype kit
4

See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486 (1966).
8

belonged to him and that it could be used to ingest methamphetamine and cocaine (R.
128: 152-153).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Point I. Defendant raises multiple claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel;
however, the claims are largely undeveloped and otherwise inadequate under the briefing
rule. They should be rejected on these grounds. To the extent the Court may deem the
claims sufficient for appellate review, defendant demonstrates no obvious deficiency on
the part of trial counsel, let alone consequent prejudice.
Point II. Defendant raises approximately four claims of prosecutorial misconduct.
These claims are inadequately briefed and can be rejected on this ground. Even if the
Court deems defendant's largely undeveloped claims sufficient for appellate review, he
fails to demonstrate that the prosecutor drew the jury's attention to matters they were
unjustified in considering.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
TRIAL COUNSEL PROVIDED EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION
A.

Defendant's Heavy Burden to Demonstrate Ineffective Assistance

In challenging the effectiveness of trial counsel, it is defendant's burden to
establish that counsel's performance both "fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness;" and also prejudiced the outcome below. State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810,
814 (Utah App. 1994) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)).
Defendant cannot show trial counsel's performance was deficient without pointing to
specific instances of inadequacy. Id. Moreover, because the Court will not second guess

9

trial counsel's legitimate strategic choices, defendant must overcome the strong
presumption that counsel's performance falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance. Id. To demonstrate prejudice, defendant must establish that
there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result
below would have been different. Id. If the Court can dispose of an allegation of
ineffectiveness on the ground that no prejudice is shown, it will do so without addressing
the adequacy of trial counsel's performance. Id.
In addition to these substantive requirements, there is a threshold requirement that
defendant must meet before his ineffective assistance claim may be considered for the
first time on direct appeal: He must provide a record adequate to permit decision of his
claims. State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 580 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah
1993). A trial record is adequate only if the Court is unaware of any evidence or
arguments which might be made and which are not before it. Id.
B.

Pre-trial Investigation

In Point 1(A) of his brief, defendant broadly asserts that trial counsel failed to
investigate the possibility of any third party culpability in the Mollerup Storage
burglaries. Aplt. Br. at 26-27. In Point 1(D) of his brief, defendant further speculates that
trial counsel should have investigated an unnamed individual who rented a storage shed
next to Solomon Le Doux, and also that trial counsel should have investigated Lynette
Talbot, the individual who claimed ownership of the camper shell retrieved from
defendant's storage shed. Aplt. Br. at 34-36. Inadequate investigation is a basis for
demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Price, 909 P.2d 256, 264 (Utah
App. 1995), cert, denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996). The Court should not reach this

10

issue, however, because defendant has not developed a record to support his claims of
inadequate investigation.
1.

Inadequate Record

"Parties claiming error below and seeking appellate review have the duty and
responsibility to support their allegations with an adequate record.1' State v. Wetzel, 868
P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1993). "Thus, the appellant has the burden of providing the reviewing
court with an adequate record on appeal to prove his allegations." Call v. City of West
Jordan, 788 P.2d 1049, 1052 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990)
{citing Broberg v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198, 201 (Utah App. 1989)); accord State v.
Wulfenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 1982), cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1044 (1983). Rule
23 B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides an opportunity to develop a record for
ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal. Garrett, 849 P.2d at 581.
Defendant, however, has not availed himself of this procedure. He therefore fails to
provide a record upon which this Court may consider his claims of deficient investigation
on direct appeal. Absent an adequate record on appeal, the reviewing court will
necessarily assume the regularity of the proceedings below. Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d
1148, 1150 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 1033 (1990); State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d
688, 699 (Utah App. 1995), cert, denied, 913 P.2d 749 (Utah Feb. 6, 1996). The Court
should do so here. There is no indication in the available record that trial counsel did not
investigate the unnamed woman, Talbot, or any other possibility of third party culpability,
or, that the investigation would have been fruitful.
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2.

No Prejudice

In any event, defendant's claims fail to meet the prejudice prong of the Strickland
standard and can be rejected on this ground as well. Defendant cannot establish prejudice
"simply by identifying unexplored avenues of investigation. Rather, he must demonstrate
a reasonable probability that further investigation would have yielded sufficient
information to alter the outcome of his [trial]." Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 523-24
(Utah), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 966 (1994). Here, there was some evidence that Mollerup
had been recently burgled (R. 128: 6, 131). Assuming there was admissible evidence
that a third party burgled Mollerup as recently as 29 March 1998, that evidence would
only go to the unlawful entry of the storage sheds, conduct defendant did not deny (R.
128: 145-47), see add. A. If defendant had denied that he ever entered the storage sheds
on 29 March 1998, it might be relevant that a third party had done so.
To the contrary, defendant has always maintained that he entered the storage sheds
and removed property he hoped to sell at the swap meet (R. 128: 145, 152), see add. A.
Asserting that he believed the property was abandoned or otherwise "dumpster" quality,
defendant suggests only that he lacked the requisite mental state for burglary. Aplt. Br. at
26. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1995) ("A person is guilty of burglary if he enters
or remains unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with intent to commit a
felony or theft"). It is a defense to theft that the actor "[o]btained or exercised control
over the property or service honestly believing that the owner, if present, would have
consented." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402 (1995). However, whether someone else
unlawfully entered the storage sheds is irrelevant to this defense. Accordingly, defendant
fails to demonstrate any prejudice due to the alleged lack of third party culpability
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evidence. See State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1240 (Utah App. 1995) (M[t]rial counsel's
decision regarding the proper allocation of pretrial resources is normally a tactical
decision, which this court will not overturn absent, a showing of unreasonableness or
prejudice").
C.

Defendant's Statements

In Point 1(B) of his brief, defendant asserts that trial counsel performed deficiently
in not moving to suppress his statement that everything in the truck belonged to him, and
also his statements claiming ownership of the "hype kit," and admitting that he had a drug
problem. Aplt. Br. at 29, 31-32.5 Defendant provides no meaningful analysis of the
record or pertinent authority demonstrating that these statements were obtained pursuant
to custodial interrogation in violation of Miranda. His claims of ineffective assistance
should therefore be rejected.
1.

Inadequate Briefing

Whenever an accused is subjected to custodial interrogation, he must be given the
benefit of a Miranda warning. State v. Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, 545 (Utah App. 1997); State
v. Strausberg, 895 P.2d 831, 834 (Utah App. 1995). One is in custody for purposes of
Miranda when his "freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal
arrest" State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah 1996) (additional quotations
5

There are number of nominal allusions in defendant's brief to other potential
issues which are not included in the heading to defendant's Point 1(B). For example,
defendant suggests that his consent to search was coerced, and that the inventory search
was invalid. Aplt. Br. at 29-31. The State does not respond to these undeveloped
comments. See State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 346 n.4 (Utah App.) (declining to reach
state constitutional claim which was "not developed to any meaningful extent"), cert,
denied, 868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1993). See also authority in subpart 1(C)(1), supra.
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omitted); Yoder, 935 P.2d at 545. Whether a person who has not been formally arrested
is ,fin custody" for Miranda purposes "depends on an objective assessment of the
circumstances of the interrogation with respect to the compulsory nature of the
interrogation rather than on the subjective intent or suspicions of the officers conducting
the examination." Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1147.
The custody determination is aided by review of five factors: "(1) the site of
interrogation; (2) whether the interrogation focused on the accused; (3) whether the
objective indicia of arrest were present; [] (4) the length and form of interrogation [;]", id.
and "(5) whether the defendant came to the place of interrogation freely and willingly."
State v. Gray, 851 P.2d 1217, 1224 (Utah App.) (citations omitted), cert, denied, 860 P.2d
943 (Utah 1993); see also Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Utah 1983).
Here, defendant claims that he was subjected to custodial interrogation without
benefit of Miranda warnings. Aplt. Br. at 28-32. He wholly fails, however, to analyze
the facts of this case under the pertinent custody factors set forth above. Id. Indeed,
regarding defendant's statement claiming ownership of the property in the back of his
truck, defendant makes no argument that the length and form of the on-the-scene
questioning compels a conclusion of custody, that there were any indicia of arrest, or that
there was any articulated focus on him as a suspect. Aplt. Br. at 28-32.
As for defendant's statements claiming ownership of the "hype kit" and
acknowledging his drug problem, these statements were volunteered following
defendant's arrest and after he had been handcuffed and placed in a patrol car. The State
does not therefore dispute that defendant was in custody at the time. However, defendant
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fails to provide any meaningful analysis or case authority demonstrating that his
statements were improperly elicited through interrogation. Aplt. Br. at 29, 31-32.
Defendant's failures to provide meaningful analysis of the facts and authority
pertinent to the claimed Miranda violations is reason enough to dismiss his claims of
ineffective assistance. See, e.g., State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989); State
v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984); State v. Farrow, 919 P.2d 50, 53 n.l (Utah
App. 1996); State v. Streeter, 900 P.2d 1097, 1100 n.3 (Utah App. 1995), cert, denied,
913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996); State v. Jennings, 875 P.2d 566, 569 n.3 (Utah App. 1994);
State v. Mincy, 838 P.2d 648, 652 n.2 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah
1992); State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 248-50 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Day, 815 P.2d
1345, 1351 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Cayer, 814 P.2d 604, 613 (Utah App. 1991); State
v. Sterger, 808 P.2d 122, 125 n.2 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Pascoe, 11A P.2d 512, 514
n.l (Utah App. 1989).
2.

No Obviously Deficient Performance

To the extent defendant's cursory allegations are deemed sufficient for appellate
review, he cannot show that he was so obviously subjected to custodial interrogation
without benefit of Miranda warnings, that trial counsel performed deficiently in not
moving to suppress his statements. See State v. Labrum, 881 P.2d 900, 906 (Utah App.
1994) (suggesting that obvious prong of plain error analysis applies to claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel), overruled on other grounds, 925 P.2d 937 (Utah 1996).
Turning first to defendant's statement claiming ownership of the property in the
back of the truck, this statement was elicited at the scene while the officers were still
gathering information about the suspected burglary {see R. 128: 37-39, 79-80) (copies of
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the pertinent transcript pages are contained in addendum B). This initial questioning was
brief and investigatory in nature. Under this circumstance of "[g]eneral on-the-scene
questioning as to facts surrounding the crime or other general questioning of citizens in
the factfinding process . . . the compelling atmosphere inherent in the process of incustody interrogation is not necessarily present." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486, 477
(1966). See also Mincy, 838 P.2d at 653 ("If the questioning is merely investigatory,
courts have not found custody."). Even if the questioning itself turned from investigatory
to accusatory by the time the officers inquired about the property inside defendant's truck,
this factor would not alone render the situation custodial. Id. ("The change from
investigatory to accusatory questioning occurs when the 'police have reasonable grounds
to believe that a crime has been committed and also reasonable grounds to believe that the
defendant committed it.'").
While two officers were present at the time the statement was made, see Statement
of Facts at p. 6-7, infra, the scene at Mollerup Storage cannot fairly be described as police
dominated. See People v. Robbins, 654 N.Y.S.2d 494, 494 (App. div. 1997) (finding
police dominated atmosphere where stationhouse interview was conducted with at least
seven different officers questioning defendant in teams of two or more); People v.
Bookless, 502 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847 (App. div. 1986) (finding scene was police dominated
where four to six officers were present at the time defendant was questioned while sitting
inside locked patrol car). This is particularly true where codefendant, as well as Lynette
Talbot, Nicole Ayers and other potential witnesses were variously present {see R. 128:
37-39, 42-43, 51, 65-71, 82-84, 89-90, 126). See, e.g., State v. Martinez, 457 P.2d 613,
614 (Utah 1969) (deeming it significant that home interview was conducted in presence
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of suspect's wife and friend). Moreover, courts are unlikely to find questioning to be
custodial when conducted "in a place of public accommodation," like Mollerup Storage.
See W. LaFave, Criminal Procedure, § 6.6 p. 496 n. 51 (1984) (collecting authority).
Finally, the officers used no coercive or compulsive stratagem in questioning
defendant and codefendant about their purpose and presence at the scene. See
Straus berg, 895 P.2d at 835 n.5 ("The absence of coercive or compulsive strategy on the
officer's part evidences a noncustodial interrogation that does not suggest the type of
abuse Miranda is intended to prevent") (citations omitted). There were no indicia of
arrest, which typically include "readied handcuffs, locked doors or drawn guns." State v.
Kelly, 718 P.2d 385, 391 (Utah 1986) (citation omitted). Nor did the officers express any
intent to arrest defendant or codefendant. Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1148 (clarifying that an
officer's unarticulated, subjective focus on a particular suspect is irrelevant to the
determination of whether the suspect is "in custody" for Miranda purposes).
In any event, even if improperly obtained, defendant's statement claiming that
property inside the truck belonged to him is not necessarily inconsistent with the defense
strategy that defendant believed the property he was taking from the storage sheds was
junk on its way to the dumpster (R. 128: 152), see add. A. See also Aplt. Br. at 26.
Moreover, on direct examination by trial counsel, defendant further explained his
statement:
Counsel:

Did you ever tell [the officer] it was all your
property?

Defendant:

After - after the lady had gotten there, or at the time
that they had - yeah, they did ask me if it was all my
property. And I said - I said well, I would have to
look in there. There may be some little bits of stuff. I
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said but I would have to look in there and go through it
to be positively sure. But, yes, I said most of that stuff
was mine.
(R. 151), see add. A. Defendant has not included in the record on appeal, trial counsel's
closing argument. Therefore, on this record, defendant fails to show that trial counsel
lacked any strategic purpose in not objecting to the admission of the statement. Strain,
885 P.2d at 814; Garrett, 849 P.2d at 580; Wulfenstein, 657 P.2d at 293.
Turning next to defendant's statements claiming ownership of the "hype kit," and
also acknowledging his drug problem, as noted previously, the State does not dispute that
defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes at the time he made these statements, see
Statement of the Facts at pp. 7-8, infra. However, defendant fails to demonstrate that
these statements were elicited through interrogation. See Aplt. Br. at 29, 31. Officer
Stevens showed the "hype kit" to Officer Hackworth in defendant's presence (see R. 128:
44, 96). Shortly thereafter, Officer Hackworth took defendant to jail, and defendant
volunteered to Officer Hackworth that the "hype kit" belonged to him and that he had a
drug problem (id.). Volunteered statements are not barred by Miranda. Miranda, 384
U.S. at 478 ("Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment
and their admissibility is not affect by our holding today").
Based on the above, there is no obvious Miranda violation such that trial counsel
can be said to have performed deficiently in not moving to suppress defendant's
statements claiming ownership of property in the truck, the hype kit, and acknowledging
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his drug problem. Labrum, 881 P.2d at 906. Even if defendant was in custody at the time
he claimed ownership of the property in his truck, defendant fails to show that admission
of his statement lacked any strategic value. Strain, 885 P.2d at 814; Garrett, 849 P.2d at
580. Defendant thus fails to establish any obviously deficient performance on the part of
trial counsel and his claims of such should be rejected.
3.

No Prejudice

Even if, on this record, trial counsel can be said to have performed deficiently in
not moving to suppress defendant's statements, defendant fails to demonstrate prejudice.
Strain, 885 P.2d at 814 (Utah App. 1994). The evidence against defendant was
overwhelming. For example, the record is devoid of indication that defendant or
codefendant were authorized to enter or remove property from any storage shed other
than defendant's, conduct which defendant did not deny (R. 128: 145-47), see add. A.
Further, Solomon LeDoux observed defendant and codefendant removing items from the
storage sheds and placing them in defendant's truck (R. 128: 4-8). Nicole Ayers also
identified her couch on top of defendant's truck and her bedframe inside the truck (R.
128: 66). Police also retrieved Nicole's day planner from the truck (R. 128: 39-41).
Although defendant's defense strategy was to claim that he believed the property he took
was junk, he also admitted that the couch was "pretty nice" (R. 128: 146), see add. A.
Even if the record supported defendant's assertion that the other items of property he took
were junk, and/or that a third party did the initial breaking and entering, defendant's
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admitted looting is not a defense to burglary. Moreover, the Mhype kit" was found in
defendant's truck and the drugs were found on his person (R. 128: 44, 94). Therefore,
admission of evidence that defendant claimed ownership of the property and Mhype kifin
his truck, and also admitted he had a drug problem, even if improper, was not
prejudicially so.
D.

Defendant's Vre-Miranda, Pre-Arrest Silence

Another issue of ineffective assistance only nominally alluded to in the body of
defendant's Point 1(B) is the admissibility of his alleged prz-Miranda, pre-arrest silence.
Defendant arguably attempts to develop this allusion by citing State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d
339 (Utah App.), cert denied, 868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1993), for the proposition that a
suspect's pxz-Miranda, pre-arrest silence is inadmissible. Aplt. Br. at 28-29. Defendant's
reliance on Palmer is misplaced. Contrary to defendant's assertion, Palmer does not hold
that it is impermissible to impeach a suspect with his/her pxz-Miranda, pre-arrest silence.
Rather, as recognized in Palmer, it is a defendant's posi-Mirartda silence which cannot be
used at trial. Palmer, 860 P.2d at 347 (citing Doyle v. United States, 426 U.S. 610
(1976)). This is so because silence following the delivery of Miranda warnings, "could
simply be an exercise of the these rights." Id. Palmer extends this reasoning to the
situation where a suspect actually invokes his/her Miranda rights even before those rights
have been delivered, and holds that evidence of the suspect's subsequent silence cannot
therefore be used in the State's case-in-chief. Palmer, 860 P.2d at 349. Defendant does
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not allege, nor is there indication in the record that he invoked his Miranda rights either
before or after the rights were administered to him. Palmer therefore has no application
on these facts.
Defendant also identifies R. 128: 26, 31-33, see add. B, as the record cites where
evidence of his pre-Miranda silence was allegedly admitted. However, no such evidence
is admitted at R. 128: 26. As for evidence admitted at R. 128: 31-33, it shows that over
trial counsel's objection, Officer Hackworth testified that codefendant answered a preMiranda, pre-arrest question posed to defendant about what they had found in the storage
sheds (R. 128: 31), see add. B. Moreover, trial counsel subsequently requested a mistrial
claiming that the prosecutor had improperly adduced evidence of his pre-Miranda, prearrest silence, which request was denied (R. 128: 99-103), see add. B.
Defendant wholly fails to analyze these facts, including the significance of trial
counsel's efforts to preclude this evidence and the trial court's rulings thereon. See Aplt.
Br. at 27-32. Indeed, defendant makes no allegation of plain error in regards to the trial
court's rulings. Id. Defendant comments only that he "chose to remain silent during
much of the interview.M Aplt. Br. at 30. This terse statement constitutes the sum total of
defendant's nominal analysis. Id. Such is inadequate under the briefing rule and should
be rejected. See Palmer, 860 P.2d at 346 n. 4 and authority cited in subpart 1(C)(1), infra.
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E.

Le Doux's Testimony

In Point 1(C) of his brief, defendant raises several claims of ineffective assistance
in regard to the admissibility of Solomon Le Doux's testimony. Aplt. Br. at 32. This
Court should not reach these claims because they are inadequately briefed and/or
unsupported in the available record.
1*

Inadequate Briefing

First, defendant complains there was insufficient foundation laid for Le Doux's
testimony about Mollerup Storage's policy on overdue rent. Aplt. Br. at 32-33. Other
than complain that Le Doux was not connected to Mollerup management, defendant fails
to identify what foundation was lacking. Id. Indeed, upon review of the available
record, there was no basis for an objection. See State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah
1982) ("Effective representation does not require counsel to object when doing so would
be futile."). Le Doux did not claim to be part of Mollerup management, but rather
testified based on his personal experience as a Mollerup customer. Specifically, Le Doux
rented at Mollerup for approximately one year, during which time he was overdue on his
rent (R. 128: 8-9) (copies of pertinent transcript pages are included in addendum C). As
a result of his being overdue on rent, Mollerup placed an additional lock on Le Doux's
storage unit, preventing his access thereto (id.). This testimony was elicited on voir dire
by trial counsel below (id.). Le Doux did not offer any testimony with regard to
Mollerup's policy on abandoned property (R. 128: 9), see add. C. Defendant provides no
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meaningful analysis of his foundational challenge to LeDoux's testimony, let alone, any
supporting authority. Aplt. Br. at 32. His claim of deficient performance is therefore
inadequate under the briefing rule and should be rejected on that ground. See authority in
Point 1(C)(1), infra.
Second, defendant nominally complains that Le Doux's testimony was irrelevant
under rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence, and that it was more prejudicial than probative
under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. Aplt. Br. at 33. His rule 401 claims consists of
nothing more than a recitation of rule 401 and an unanalyzed assertion of irrelevancy. Id.
Defendant's rule 403 claim consists of little more than the assertion that Le Doux's
testimony allowed the jury to assume that Mollerup customers never abandoned their
property, and that even if they did, Mollerup never left their storage units open. Id.
Defendant's assertions in this regard grossly over construe Le Doux's testimony (see R.
128: 8-9), see add. C, and defendant wholly fails to explain how the jury could otherwise
arrive at these unsupported assumptions.6 Because these claims are unsupported in the
record and case authority, they are similarly inadequate under the briefing rule and should
be rejected. See authority in Point 1(C)(1), infra.

6

Mollerup Secretary, Tracy Timmons, testified regarding Mollerup's procedure in
dealing with overdue rent, and in dealing with potentially abandoned property. See n.2
infra.
23

2.

Inadequate Record

Defendant raises additional claims which the Court should not reach because he
has failed to provide an adequate record. See authority in Point 1(A)(1). Defendant
complains that trial counsel failed to call into question Le Doux's alleged inconsistent
statements, and failed to argue that defendant made no effort to hide his activities from Le
Doux. Aplt. Br. at 32, 34. However, defendant fails to explain what about Le Doux's
testimony was inconsistent, nor has he included in the record on appeal trial counsel's
closing argument. The record is therefore inadequate to determine what arguments trial
counsel did or did not make regarding LeDoux's testimony. See authority in Point
1(A)(1).
Defendant also fails to support in the record his further suggestion that trial
counsel failed to adequately investigate Mollerup Storage's policy and procedure
regarding abandoned property. Aplt. Br. at 33. On this record, defendant cannot show
that trial counsel did not investigate, or that the fruits of that investigation would have
been favorable to his defense strategy. As noted previously, defendant has not availed
himself of the opportunity to provide a supporting record under rule 23 B, Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. See Point 1(B)(1), infra. The record is therefore inadequate to
determine the merits, if any, of defendant's claim in this regard and it should also be
rejected. Id.
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F.

Hodgepodge of Undeveloped Claims Relating to Trial Strategy

The heading of defendant's Point 1(D), asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective
for resting without presenting defense witnesses, requiring defendant to request a reopening of the case in order to testify, which he consequently did. Aplt. Br. at 34. The
body of the point, however, constitutes a hodgepodge of nominal references to, among
other things, trial counsel's waiver of opening statement, and trial counsel's nonobjection to hearsay testimony that Talbot claimed ownership of the camper shell. Aplt.
Br. at 34-35.7 Defendant's nominal and scattered second-guessing of trial counsel's
strategy is wholly inadequate for appellate review. See Palmer, 860 P.2d at 346, n.4 and
authority in Point 1(C)(1), infra. See also State v. Harry, 873 P.2d 1149, 1154 (Utah App.
1994) (refusing to "second-guess trial counsel's legitimate strategic choices, however
flawed those choices might appear in retrospect"). Even assuming these nominal
allusions suffice to demonstrate deficient performance, defendant does not even attempt
to demonstrate, let alone establish, any consequent prejudice. See Aplt. Br. at 34-36. His
claims of ineffective assistance should therefore be rejected, Strain, 885 P.2d at 814, and
the State does not attempt to further parse defendant's nominal allegations.

defendant's allegations that counsel performed deficiently in not calling as
witnesses an unidentified woman present at Mollerup Storage on the day of the
burglaries, and Lynnette Talbot, the owner of the camper shell, see Aplt. Br. at 34, are
addressed in Point 1(B), infra.
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G.

Photographs of Property Found in Defendant's Truck and Storage
Shed
1.

Inadequate Record

In Point 1(E) of his brief, defendant complains that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to object on foundational grounds to the admissibility of photographs of his truck,
property recovered from his truck, and also property found in his storage shed. Aplt. Br.
at 36-38. This Court should not reach this issue because defendant has not included the
complained of photographs in the record on appeal.8 As set out in Point 1(A)(1), it is the
appellant's responsibility to support an allegation of error with an adequate record.
Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1993). Absent an adequate record on appeal, the reviewing
court will necessarily assume the regularity of the proceedings below. Jolivet, 784 P.2d
at 1150; Blubaugh, 904 P.2d at 699.
2.

Inadequate Briefing

In any event, to the extent defendant complains that Exh. ## P-l, P-2, P-6, P-6, P-7
and Exh. #15, were admitted without sufficient foundation, see Aplt. Br. at 36-37, his
claim is unsupported in the available record.9 Adequate foundation to authenticate
8,f

[P]hysical exhibits other than documents are not transmitted by the clerk of the
trial court unless directed to do so by a party or by the clerk of the appellate court. A
party must make advance arrangement with the clerks for the transportation and receipt of
exhibits of unusual bulk or weight." Utah R. App. P. 12(b)(4).
9

The State does not address defendant's nominal references to Exh. ## P-7, P-10
and Exh. # 15 because defendant wholly fails to identify or discuss the content of these
exhibits. Palmer, 860 P.2d at 346 n.4. Defendant also suggests that photographs of the
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photographs "may be laid by testimony which establishes that the evidence is what the
proponent claims it to be." State v. Purcell, 711 P.2d 243, 245 (Utah 1985). Generally,
"if a competent witness with personal knowledge of the facts represented by a photograph
testifies that the photograph accurately reflects those facts, it is admissible." Id. Here,
Nicole Ayers testified that Exh.# P-l was a photograph of her couch (R. 128: 61-62).
Ayers further testified that Exh. # P-2 was a photograph of the box in which she had
stored her day planner (R. 128: 64). Officers Hackworth and Stevens testified that Exh.
# P-6 was a photograph of defendant's truck (R. 128: 20, 79). Finally, Officer Stevens
testified that Exh. # P-10 was a photograph of property removed from defendant's truck
which belonged to Ayers (R. 128: 92). Defendant cites no authority establishing that the
above testimony is inadequate to authenticate the photographs. Aplt. Br. at 36-37. His
claim is therefore inadequately briefed, see authority in Point 1(C)(1), and also fails to
establish any obviously deficient performance, let alone prejudice. Labrum, 881 P.2d at
906; Malmrose, 649 P.2d at 59; Strain, 885 P.2d at 814.
Defendant also nominally complains about the admission of his statement
acknowledging that he did not believe the washing machine was garbage, and that "in his
heart he knew it was wrong to take it." Aplt. Br. at 38 (citing R. 128: 127-129) (copies

washing machine and camper shell recovered from his storage shed were admitted, see
Aplt. Br. at 37; however, defendant's claim is unsupported by citation to the record and
the State is unable to discern on the available record that such pictures were in fact
admitted.
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of the pertinent transcript pages are contained in addendum D. In challenging the
admission of this uncharged conduct, defendant is attempting to raise a rule 404(b), Utah
Rules of Evidence, issue.10 However, he wholly fails to cite to the rule, or otherwise
demonstrate that the evidence was admitted solely for the purpose of demonstrating that
he has a propensity for thefVburglary. See Aplt. Br. at 37-38. To the contrary, because
defendant claimed to believe that the property he removed was garbage, defendant's
admission that the washing machine was not junk was relevant and probative of his
intent. State v. Brown, 577 P.2d 135, 136 (Utah 1978). As noted previously, trial counsel
is not required to make futile objections. Malmrose, 649 P.2d at 59. Defendant's
undeveloped and nominal claim should be rejected. Palmer, 860 P.2d at 346 n.4.
H.

Scope of Prosecutor's Cross-Examination

In Point 1(F) of his brief, defendant complains that trial counsel was ineffective in
failing to raise a "scope" objection to the prosecutor's cross-examination of him regarding
the "hype kit" and marijuana which provided the basis for the drug charges. Aplt. Br. at

'Rule 404(b) provides:
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes,
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. In other words, evidence
offered under this rule is admissible if it is relevant for a non-character
purpose and meets the requirements of Rules 402 and 403.
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38-39. See also (R. 128: 152-154), see add. A. Defendant's direct testimony was limited
to an explanation of his conduct in entering and removing property from storage sheds at
Mollerup Storage on the date of the burglaries (R. 128: 141-152), see Add. A. Defendant
complains that because he was not examined about the "hype kit" or the marijuana on
direct, the prosecutor's cross-examination violated rule 104(d), Utah Rules of Evidence.
That rule provides that an "accused does not, by testifying upon a preliminary matter,
become subject to cross-examination as to other issues in the case." Rule 104(a) further
explains that preliminary matters constitute the "qualification of a person to be a witness,
the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence^]" Defendant's allegation of
ineffective assistance is devoid of meaningful analysis or supporting legal authority
demonstrating that his testimony on direct was limited to preliminary matters or that the
prosecutor's cross-examination as to defendant's charged conduct in possessing both the
"hype kit" and the marijuana was otherwise improper under rule 104(d). It should be
rejected on this ground. See authority cited in Point 1(C)(1), infra. Even if his claim is
deemed sufficient, defendant has not attempted to demonstrate, let alone establish, any
consequent prejudice, and his claim should be rejected on this ground as well. Strain, 885
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P.2d at 814.11 Notably, defendant raises no claim of prosecutorial misconduct in regards
to this issue.
I.

Consensual Search of Defendant's Truck

In Point 1(G) of his brief, defendant cites sundry Fourth Amendment authority and
makes several nominal and undeveloped comments related to the Fourth Amendment
activity of the investigating officers which the State does not therefore address. See Aplt.
Br. at 39-40. See also Palmer, 860 P.2d at 346 n.4. If defendant is challenging the
warrantless search of his truck, he wholly fails to recognize that he asked the officers if
they wanted to look in his truck (R. 128: 40, 85, 151), see add. A, or to otherwise
demonstrate that his consensual behavior was unknowing or involuntary. See Aplt. Br. at
39-40. Consent to search is an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment. State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103 (Utah 1980); State v. ContreU 886 P.2d
1

defendant nominally comments in the body of Point 1(F) that trial counsel
stipulated to his guilt on the above drug charges. Aplt. Br. at 39. If this is an additional
claim of ineffective assistance, defendant has not attempted to demonstrate, let alone
establish, any consequent prejudice. Strain, 885 P.2d at 814. Nor could he. The drugs
and paraphernalia were recovered from defendant's person and his truck; therefore, there
was no real defense to these charges below. Trial counsel may have hoped to increase
credibility with the jury in his denial of the felony burglary charge, by admitting the
misdemeanor drug charges. See State v. Baker, No. 911650-CA, slip op. at 9-10 (Utah
App. July 30 1998) (recognizing that trial counsel is not required "to develop every
conceivable defense that [is] available," particularly "where evidence on the issue weighs
heavily in favor of the State and a decision to dispute the issue could negatively affect
counsel's credibility with the fact-finder when asserting other, more viable defenses.")
(citation omitted). This undeveloped claim should be rejected. Palmer, 860 P.2d at 346
n.4.
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107 (Utah App. 1994), cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995). As noted previously,
trial counsel is not required to make futile objections. Malmrose, 649 P.2d at 59.
Defendant's inadequately briefed claim fails to demonstrate any deficient performance,
let alone prejudice, and should be rejected. See authority in Point 1(C)(1); Strain, 885
P.2dat814.
POINT II
THE PROSECUTOR'S CONDUCT WAS PROPER
A.

Opening Statement

In Point 11(A) of his brief, defendant complains that the prosecutor committed
misconduct in his opening statement by commenting on an instance of defendant's preMiranda silence in alleged violation of State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339 (Utah App. 1993).
The prosecutor stated that defendant showed police his own storage shed, but
f,

volunteer[ed] no other information to the officer at that time, other than the fact that

that's my shedM (R. 129: 7) (a complete copy of the prosecutor's opening statement is
contained in addendum E). In order to establish that this statement amounts to
prosecutorial misconduct, defendant must show that the prosecutor called to the juror's
attention a matter they could not consider in reaching their verdict. Palmer, 860 P.2d at
342; State v. Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897
(Utah 1993); State v. Saunders, 893 P.2d 584, 590 n.7 (Utah App.), cert, granted, 910
P.2d 425 (Utah 1995). Having preserved no objection below, defendant must also show
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that the prosecutor so clearly directed the jurors' attention to inappropriate matters that
the trial court should have intervened on his behalf, and that the absence of a sua sponte
intervention undermines confidence in the guilty verdict. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d
1201, 1223 (Utah 1993); Palmer, 860 P.2d at 342 (holding that plainly erroneous
prosecutorial misconduct requires error that is obvious and that undermines confidence in
the outcome). However, defendant wholly fails to engage in any analysis demonstrating
that the prosecutor's opening statement remark constitutes plain error. See Aplt. Br. at
41-43. His claim of prosecutorial misconduct regarding the prosecutor's opening
statement is therefore waived. State v. Johnson, 11A P.2d 1141,1144-45 (Utah 1989);
State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995). In any event, as set out in Point
1(D), because no Palmer violation occurred on these facts, there was no impropriety in the
prosecutor's comment.
B.

Direct Examination of Officer Hackworth

Defendant also alleges in Point 11(A) of his brief, that the prosecutor acted
improperly in questioning Officer Hackworth about defendant's pre-Miranda, pre-arrest
silence in alleged violation of Palmer. Aplt. Br. at 41. Defendant complains that this
questioning improperly brought out evidence that he remained silent during most of the
questioning. Aplt. Br. at 41 (citing R. 128: 26, 31-33), see add. B.12 Trial counsel raised

12

As noted previously, no instance of defendant's pre-Miranda silence was
admitted at R. 128: 26, see add. B.
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an objection to the questioning, however, which was overruled (see R. 128: 31-34), see
add. B. Moreover, as set out in Point 1(D), infra, no Palmer violation occurred on these
facts. Defendant wholly fails to explain how, given the trial court's ruling below and the
lack of a. Palmer violation, he can prevail on either his claim of ineffective assistance, see
Point 1(D), infra, or his claim of prosecutorial misconduct. See Aplt. Br. at 41-43.
Defendant's undeveloped claim does not suffice for appellate review. Palmer, 860 P.2d
at 346 n.4. However, even if it did, given that there was no Palmer violation, he has not
shown that the prosecutor's questioning of Officer Hackworth called the jurors' attention
to matters they were unjustified in considering. Palmer, 860 P.2d at 342; Cummins, 839
P.2d at 852; Saunders, 893 P.2d at 590 n.7. His claim of prosecutorial misconduct should
be rejected.
C.

Hearsay

Defendant nominally alludes to a third instance of prosecutorial misconduct in
Point 11(A) of his brief, complaining that the prosecutor erred in introducing hearsay
testimony that Lynette Talbot owned the camper shell retrieved from his storage shed.
Aplt. Br. at 42. Defendant provides no meaningful analysis grounded in the record and
cites no authority demonstrating that this evidence was improperly before the jury. Aplt.
Br. 42. His undeveloped claim should be rejected. See Palmer, 860 P.2d at 364 n.4.13
l3

Defendant previously nominally commented that admission of this evidence
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. See Aplt. Br. at 34. Defendant's
undeveloped comment in that regard is also inadequate for appellate review. See Point
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Even if defendant's claim is deemed adequate for review, he fails to establish any
consequent prejudice in the admission of this hearsay testimony. Indeed, defendant
complains only that he was not charged with theft of Talbot's camper shell. Aplt. Br. at
42. He wholly fails to acknowledge, however, that evidence of uncharged misconduct is
admissible to prove intent, a disputed element in this case. See Utah R. Evid. 404(b). See
also Point 1(G), infra. Thus, the prosecutor elicited no information that the jury was not
justified in considering. Palmer, 860 P.2d at 342. Defendant's claim should be rejected
on this ground. Id.
D.

Uncharged Misconduct

In Point 11(B) of his brief, defendant alleges that the prosecutor committed
misconduct in eliciting from Detective Bryson, defendant's statement that the washing
machine was not junk and that he knew it was wrong to take it. Aplt. Br. at 44.
Defendant challenged admission of this uncharged misconduct in conjunction with his
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Aplt. Br. at 36-38. For the same reasons
that admission of this evidence did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, see
Point 1(G)(2), infra, it does not amount to prosecutorial misconduct: The evidence is
admissible under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, to refute defendant's claimed lack
of intent {see R. 128: 145-47, 152), see add. A.

1(F), infra.
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Defendant also complains about the prosecutor's alleged reference to and/or
admission of boxes of items and photographs of boxes of items allegedly removed from
his truck and/or storage shed, but for which the State never produced an owner(s). Aplt.
Br. at 44. Defendant fails to pinpoint his claims in the record; indeed, his allegations are
devoid of record citation. Id. The State is unaware that any boxes of unclaimed property
were admitted or otherwise relied upon by the prosecutor. As for the complained of
photographs, appellant has not included the photographs in the record on appeal. The
Court should therefore decline to reach these inadequately briefed, see Point 1(C)(1),
infra, and unsupported claims, see Point 1(G)(1), infra. In any event, this additional
evidence of uncharged misconduct, like the photographs discussed above, would be
admissible under rule 404(b), to refute defendant's claimed lack of intent {see R. 128:
145-47, 152), see add. A. See also Point 1(B)(2), (G)(2), infra}"

14

To the extent that defendant claims that he was prejudiced by the prosecutor's
alleged reliance on this evidence, he narrowly complains only that there was a dearth of
evidence that he broke into the storage sheds. Aplt.t. Br. at 44. Defendant's self-serving
assessment of the evidence against him is dubious, see Statement of the Facts, infra,
particularly in light of the fact he has never denied entering the storage sheds and
removing property which he hoped to sell at a swap meet (R. 128: 145-47, 152), see add.
A. As noted previously, looting is not a defense to burglary.
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CONCLUSION
The Court should affirm defendant's convictions.
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ADDENDA

Addendum A

1

ended.)

2
3
4

THE COURT: This is the case of State of Utah vs.
Michael Dittmer.
Jury.

The parties are present, the members of the

Mr. Gravis.

5

MR. GRAVIS: Yes. Call Michael Dittmer to the stand.

6

THE COURT: Thank you.

7

last night we informed you that there would be no further

8

testimony.

9
10

We had some further meetings, and there will be

brief testimony taken before I give you the Instructions and
we close.

11
12
13
14
15
16
17

MICHAEL DITTMER
called as a witness, and having been first duly sworn, was
examined and testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. GRAVIS:
£

State your name for the record.

A

Mike Dittmer.

Q

And you are the Defendant in this matter, is that

18
19

correct?

20

5

To the members of the Jury,

A

Yes, sir.

Q

And you understand you have a Constitutional right

21
22
23
24
25

not to testify in this matter?
A

I do.

Q

And you are voluntarily giving up that right to

testify today?
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A

Yes, sir.

Q

Okay,

Drawing your attention to the 29th of March

of this year, did you have a storage shed at what's referred
to as Mollerup?
A

Yes, sir.

I just rented it that day.

Q

Okay.

A

On the 29th of March.

Q

Okay.

And you rented it that day, you say?

And were you at the Mollerup storage sheds

that day?
A

I was.

Q

What time did you first arrive there?

A

I arrived there approximately 9:00 o'clock in the

morning to rent the storage shed and put stuff in it.
Q

Okay.

And which shed did you rent?

A

655.

Q

655 or--and then what happened then?

A

Well, I had--I lost my apartment.

stuff in my truck.

And there was some stuff I wanted to try

to take to the swap meet to sell.
keep.

I had all my

That was all mixed up.

And some stuff I wanted to

So I ended up like having to

unload the whole truck, put the stuff I wanted to keep in the
storage shed, put the stuff I wanted to take to the swap meet
back into the truck.
Q

Okay.

Then what happened?

A

As I was putting my stuff in the storage shed, I
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looked two doors down.

The door was wide open, and there was

a washing machine sitting there.

And I looked and the lid wa^

kind of tied open, because the hoses were up and in.

And I

noticed that the center of the washing machine had been broker}
And I thought, wow, that f s not that bad of a deal.

off.

could be fixed.

It

Shoot, my mom's was broke like that and they

rigged it to where it worked.

It is better than she has got.

I will take this and give it to her, thinking that it was leftj
there because it had been broken and they had either decided
it was too heavy to load, or didn't want it any longer.

And T\

looked around some more, and there was some more stuff and
more-MR. DAINES: Your Honor, I am going to object to this)
line of testimony.
rambling.

He is not answering questions.

He is just]

And I am objecting that he is not being asked

questions, and it is non-responsive at this point.
THE COURT: Thank you.
Q

Okay.

The objection is sustained.

After you looked at the washing machine, what]

did you do with it?
A

I pulled I down, scooted it down and stuck it into

my shed.
Q

And then what happened?

A

I--that's when I looked around.

I saw there was

still more stuff that was like kind of out in the aisles.
Q

Okay.

Where did you see more?
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A

All over.

There were several of them open.

just had simply empty boxes.

Some had papers.

Some

One had

motorcycle parts, some printers and stuff.
Q

Did you see the one that had the couch in it?

A

Not--well, no, not at that time.

yeah.

After I seen them,

I walked into the other building and I saw there was

still more.
Q

And I saw the one with the couch in it.

Okay.

Was this the same building or a different

building?
A

It is actually the same building.

However, it has

been divided into two sections, two aisleways.
Q

Okay.

What did you do after you saw the one with

the couch in it?
A

Well, I kind of looked around in there.

Like I

said, I had my own stuff I was taking to the swap meet.

I

though, shoot, you know there wasn't anything really worth
anything in there.

Just what I thought, I am going to the

swap meet anyway, if I can get a quarter out of it, I will
take it. And if I don't, you know, I will do whatever there,
dispose of it at that time.
And like I said, I looked around.

And I saw there was a

little teddy bear, stuffed animals, papers were all over,
boxes and everything.

And I saw the couch.

that actually--I was by myself.
Q

Okay.

I thought, well,

I wasn't going to lift it.

Did you take anything out of that storage
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1

shed at that time?

2

A

3

I did take anything I thought I could sell for a

quarter or better.

4

Several Books of Mormon, the day planner,

stuffed animals.

5

Q

Where did you put those?

6

A

I put them in my truck

Q

Okay.

7
8

Did you take any other items?

After you put

I] them in your truck, what did you do?

9

A

Well, after I had gone through and seen everything,

10

all the different storage sheds they had, whatever I thought l\

11

could get a quarter for I got.

12

I left.

13
4
15

16

And I went down to Robert Amador's

||

Q

And what did you do when you got to Robert Amador's?)

M

A

Well, Robert Amador, he is not a very well to do

|| fellow.

He could use a lot of help in a lot of places.

His

kids--

17

MR. DAINES: I will object to this, your Honor.

18

THE COURT: Sustained.

19
20

I loaded it into my truck and

Q

When you got to Robert Amador's what did you do?

Just answer the question I asked.

21

Q

Well, actually I gave him some, and the kids some of|

22

the teddy bears.

23

appreciate.

24

And it was really banged up, ugly, tore up missing cushions

25

too.

Whatever I thought, you know, they would

Robert has got a couch there that they sleep on.

His bed was simply a mattress on the floor.

Stuff that
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way.
Q

Okay.

Did you talk to him--did you have a

conversation with Robert Amador?
A

I did.

Q

And what did you tell him?

A

I told him, I says, hey, dude, I was just up there

at the swap meet, or at my storage shed.

There was a couch

there that is pretty nice, looked pretty nice.

Tomorrow I am

sure they are just going to throw it in the dumpster.

If you

want it, we should go get it.
Q

And then what did you do?

A

Well, he didn't really want anything to do with it.

He said nah, don't worry about it.
than what you got.

I said it is a lot better

I actually kind of persuaded him to go up

there and look at this couch because, you know, I knew it was
going to go in the dumpster and-Q

Did you go up and look at the couch?

A

We did.

Well, we was going to go up to the store

anyway to get the kids some Easter baskets.

At that time I

said the storage shed is right there, do you want to look at
the couch.

is.

If you don't want it, we won't get it.

Q

Okay.

So you went up there and you--

A

And I showed him and the couch and he said well, it

And we looked at it. We put the cushions all on it. It

was missing a cushion.

I said--you know, I said it is still
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better than what you got.
one.

The one cushion you sit on is all

And like I said, the kids sleep on the couch.

So I

thought that would be a lot better-MR. DAINES: I will object to what he thought, your
Honor, about the children.
THE COURT: Sustained.

Stricken, disregard it.

MR. DAINES: No evidence Mr. Amador had children.
Q

So you loaded up the couch, is that right?

A

We did.

Q

Other than the teddy bears you say you gave to the

He decided he wanted it.

children, what did you do with the other stuff you loaded up
prior from the storage shed that had the items-A

It was in my truck.

Q

So how many teddy bears did you give to his

children?
A

Well, he has three kids.

They each got one, I

guess.
Q

Okay.

A

I don't know if they even all got one or not.

Q

Okay.

And then when the police--when officer

Hackworth, the first police officer, arrived, where were you
at?
A

I was--well, we put the couch on top of the thing,

and we needed something to strap it down with.

And I told

him, well, look around and see if you can find any cords or a
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rope or anything we can tie the thing down to.

And I was up

trying to get--starting to get to where I could tie it down.
And the police officer pulled out.
kind of checking it out.

I just walked out and was

And he had pulled up.

And I

thought-MR. DAINES: I will object to what he thought, your
Honor.
Q

Just testify to what you did, not what you thought.

A

And then I just--I like--well, he pulled up and

stopped, and I just waited for him to get out to do his job, 3]
guess.
Q

Okay.

A

Explained what we were doing.
MR. DAINES: Objection, your Honor, not in response

to a question.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q

Disregard that.

Now-THE COURT: Mr. Dittmer, it is important that you

just answer the question.
A

That was the answer to the last question.

I sit

there and waited-THE COURT: Wait just a minute.
Q

Now, when the officer arrived, did he ask you

whether you were there alone or with someone?
A

I am not for sure what he said right at first.
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Yeah, he did ask at one point whether there was somebody else
He asked me what I was doing.
Q

Okay.

When did he ask you what you were doing?

A

Right at first he asked me what I was doing.

Q

What did you tell him?

A

I said well, we were loading up this couch and

stuff.

Going through and getting what we could out of these

sheds.

I told him it was going to be thrown away in my

opinion.
Q

Okay.

Now when you first saw these sheds, what was

the condition of the doors?
A

It was just rolled up.

like a garage door.

The doors, they roll up just]

And they were--they were all rolled up.

Not partially, all the way up.
Q

Okay.

And then did you and the officer go find

Robert?
A

I believe we did.

Q

Okay.

A

It seems to me--now it seems to me we were still

standing there and he was questioning me.
He was asking me my name and stuff.

And--well, he was.

And then Robert had come

out of the whole building, not just the storage shed, the
whole building, with some books and like a strap or some cords)
that we were going to use to tie down the couch.
kind of walked up and there he was.

And just

And he just kind of
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stopped.
Q

Okay.

Now when you say he was asking your name,

what name did you give him?
A

I did--

Q

What name did you give him?

A

Whatever he said it was.

thought up something.

I donft know.

Michael whatever it was.

I just
I don't know

Q

Why did you give him a false name?

A

Because I was afraid there was a warrant out for me

for a DUI ticket that I had previously gotten.
Q

Okay.

A

An unpaid ticket.

Q

Okay.

Now when Robert came--when you and the

officer and Robert started to talking, did the officer ask yoi^
what you were doing there?
A

I am sure he did.

Q

Okay.

Now at any time did they ask you whose

property was in the back of your truck?
A

He did ask me, yeah, where the stuff was coming

from.
Q

Did he ask you first off--did either Officer

Hackworth or Officer Stephens ask you whose property that was?)
A

I imagine.

I mean I told him we were just getting

stuff out of the different sheds.
Q

Did you ever tell him it was all your property?
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A

After--after the lady had gotten there, or at the

time that they had--yeah, they did ask me if it was all my
property.
there.

And I said--I said well, I would have to look in

There may be some little bits of stuff.

I said but I

would have to look in there and go through it to be positively
sure.

But, yes, I said most of that stuff was mine.
Q

Okay.

A

Actually, they were asking me what-MR. DAINES: Objection, your Honor.

He is now not

responding to questions.
MR. GRAVIS: Just answer the questions.
A

All right.

Q

Did they ask if they could look in the back of your

truck?
A

At one point they did, yes.

Q

And what was your response?

A

Sure.

Q

Who opened the door?

A

I did.

Q

Okay.

Later on you gave a statement to Detective

Bryson here, is that correct?
A

Excuse me*

Q

You gave a statement to the Detective here?

A

Yes.

Q

And at that time did you indicate what you thought
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the property--who the property belonged to?
A

I did,

Q

And who did you tell her?

A

I told her because I had previously rented a shed

from that place, and almost had my-MR. DAINES: Objection, your Honor, it is not
responding to the question.
THE COURT: Just respond to the question.
A

I told her that, yes, that there was storage sheds

there that I thought had been repoed that were left open and
the owners had apparently taken what they wanted out of it.
The auction guy had apparently taken what he was going to sell]
out of it.

The rest was left there for what I assumed was

going to be picked up and thrown in the dumpster.
MR. GRAVIS: Okay.

I have nothing further.

THE COURT: Mr. Daines.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. DAINES:
Q
bat.

Let's get two things out of the way right off the
The hype kit found on the front of your seat during the

impound inventory of your truck is yours?
A

Yes sir.

Q

That is used for the ingestion of controlled

substances such as cocaine and methamphetamine, right?
A

It has been.
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1

Q

Judging from your appearance, it is methamphetamineJ

2

A

Judging by my appearance--

3

MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, I object, it is irrelevant.

4

Did you use methamphetamine?

5

MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, I object, it is irrelevant.

6

THE COURT: The objection is sustained in the form ofl
the question.
Q

The hype kit is for the ingestion of

methamphetamine?
A
stuff.

The hype kit was--was something that I had had in my
I saw it.

keep the pouch.

I was going to throw it away.

I wanted to

And I wanted to find a proper place to

dispose of whatever else.
14

Q

It is for the ingestion of methamphetamine?

15

A

It could be.

Q

Isn't that what you have been using it for?

16
17

MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, objection.

18

MR. DAINES: He has taken the witness stand.

He is

subject to cross-examination.
MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, it is irrelevant.
it could be.

It is irrelevant whether he used methamphetamine

in the past or not.

The issue is not what it was used for.

It was whether it could be.

That's the issue here today.

THE COURT: Overruled.
Q

He said

You may answer the question.

Methamphetamine, correct?
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MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, I am going to object.
is improper.

It is irrelevant.

This

And may we approach the

Bench?
THE COURT: I have overruled the objection.

Answer

the question.
MR. GRAVIS: I object under Rule 4 04.
improper.

It is

The prejudice is--the State is trying to prejudice

the Jury by this.

The prejudicial effect clearly outweighs

any probative value.

He testified it could be used for the

ingestion of methamphetamine.

That's all he needs to prove tc|

prove a paraphernalia case.
MR. DAINES: Your Honor, if he has agreed we have
proved the paraphernalia case, I will withdraw the question.
THE COURT: Proceed.
MR. DAINES: If he has agreed to that.
Q

Also at the time that you were arrested a bag of

marijuana was found in your pocket, is that correct?
A

There was some marijuana parts in a cellophane.

Q

Okay, thank you.

1997.

Now let's go to the 2 9th of March,

On that morning you testified that you went to the

Mollerup storage at about 9:00 o'clock for the purpose of
renting a storage shed.
Q

Did you say the 27th?

Q

The 29th, I am sorry.

A

Yes, the 29th I did.
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Q

You rented a storage shed?

A

Yes, sir.

Q

You drove your green truck there?

A

I did.

Q

And you put nothing of your own in the storage shed

at the time that you rented it, correct?
A

No, sir, that!s wrong.

I did have lots of stuff in

there.
Q

You rented that storage shed for the purpose of

going back later with Robert Amador and taking things out of
other people's sheds, correct?
A

No, sir, I--

Q

Let's go over this.

You went to the place at 9:00

o'clock, right?
A

Yes, sir.

Q

Then after you went to that place between 9:30--

about 10:00 a.m. after renting that storage shed you went to
Robert Amador's house, correct?
A

After I had left there, yes.

Q

The first place you went after you rented this

storage shed on this day was Robert Amador's?
A

Actually I don't believe so.

I think I went to my

home and loaded more of my stuff in my truck.
Q

But then you went--by 10:00 a.m. you were at Robert

Amador's house, right?
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A

I went to Robert's.

Q

You went into his house, correct?

A

Yes.

Q

You told him that you had just rented a storage

shed, correct?
A

Yes.

Q

At that time you stayed at Robert Amador's home

until noon?
A

Longer than that.

Q

You stayed there approximately two hours?

A

Longer than that.

Q

And at this period of time you had said absolutely

nothing to Robert Amador about the couch between 10:00 and
12:00 a.m., correct?
A

I am not for sure what time I told him about the

couch.
Q

Is it possible that between 10:00 a.m. and 12:00

a.m. you said absolutely nothing to Robert Amador about the
couch?
A

It is possible, but probably improbable.

Q

Thank you.

Then you left Robert Amador's house and

returned about 3:00 p.m. to Robert Amador's house, correct?
A

It could possibly be, yes.

Q

Okay.

So when you say I went there and then went tc|

Robert Amador's house, you actually went to Robert Amador's
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house two times; once in the morning and once at 3:00 p.m.,
correct?
A

It could be.

I left and went--that!s when I took m^j

stuff and left.
Q

All right.

And at that time you told him you saw a

couch?
A

Okay.

Q

And at that time you took him over there to--but yo\^

did not leave at 3:00 p.m.

You didn't go over until about

6:00, correct?
A

Yes.

Q

Just before it got dark you guys went to the

Mollerup place?
A

Actually he didn't want to go there.

He wanted to

go to the store to cash a check to get the kids an Easter
basket.
Q

But you did--I know you like to talk about his kids,

but I didn't ask you about his kids.

You went to Mollerup

Storage with Robert Amador?
A

At the time we left his home, we had--

Q

Did you go to Mollerup Storage with Robert Amador at]

6:00 o'clock?
A

Yes, sir.

Q

Okay.

And so you have actually been to Mollerup,

then to Amador's house, then gone for three hours, then back
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to Amador's house at 3:00 p.m., and it is not until 6:00 p.m.
that you then go to Mollerup, right?
A

Sir, we were leaving to go to the store.

We weren't)

leaving to go to Mollerup.
Q

But you did go to Mollerup?

A

We ended up there, yes.

Q

Okay.

Then when you got to Mollerup 1 s, when the

police officer arrived, the storage shed from which you took
much of Nicole Ayer's property is not in the same door as your)
storage shed, is that correct?
A

That's correct.

Q

In fact, if we show you State's proposed Exhibit

number 1, this shows the couch out by your truck, right?
A

Yes, sir.

Q

It shows an open door, right?

A

Yes, sir.

Q

Right in the upper right hand corner as you face the)

photograph there is a door?
A

Yes, sir.

Q

And the hallway inside that door goes to Nicole

Ayer's storage shed?
A

Yes, sir.

Q

In fact, you can also see way down here, the door

that goes into your storage shed?
A

Yes, sir.
1581

Q

And your truck is not parked in front of your door,

it is parked in front of Nicole Ayer f s door, correct?
A

Yes, sir.
MR. DAINES: All right.

May I again approach the

Jury so they can see what I was referring to immediately?
THE COURT: You may.
MR. DAINES: May I point it out to them?

Martin, do

you have an objection to that, since the witness chair is oveij
here?
MR. GRAVIS: If you want to point things out, that's
fine.
MR. DAINES: Nicole Ayer's door in the corner, the
door into the hallway where the Defendant's storage shed is
located.
Q

You then went into--you parked your truck outside

Nicole Ayer's storage shed and you went in to where her
storage shed, 552, was.
A

You and Amador, right?

The door leads to a hallway that goes to many

storage sheds.
Q

And you got that door about halfway up--

A

No, sir, that door was already open totally.

Q

And the couch was only pulled halfway out?

A

I am not sure if it was pulled out at all.

Q

And all of the sudden, Solomon Le Doux walked in.

You didn't know him, did you?
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A

I didn't even see him.

Q

But a man walked in, and at the time he walked in,

the storage shed was still only--the door was only halfway up,|
and the couch was only halfway pulled out of the shed,
correct?
A

No, that's not correct.

Q

In other words, Solomon Le Doux caught you guys

right in the act of getting into that shed, didn't he?
A

I have no idea what he saw or didn't see.

I didn't

even see him.
Q

And by the time the police officer arrived, not ver^

long after Mr. Le Doux was in there, you already then had the
couch up on top of your truck, right?
A

Yes, sir.

Q

When the officers asked you who does the property

belong to in the back, you told him it is all mine?
A

I told him it was my stuff in the back of my truck.

Q

All your stuff in the back of the truck?

A

When he said is it all yours, I said I would have to)

observe it.

There may be some little stuff there that I have

got.
Q

Little stuff.

Calling your attention to what has

been marked P-7, all of that property belonging to Nicole
Ayers was in the back of your truck, right?
A

Except that toaster was mine.
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Q

The toaster is yours.

All of the rest of the

property is Nicole Ayers?
A

Well, I would have to see what all was in them

boxes.
Q

And yet--

A

Because I do know there was some--

7

Q

Her bed, right?

8

A

Her bed.

9

Q

There is a bed frame right there?

10

A

Oh, the bed frame was hers, yes.

11

Q

The couch is hers?

12

A

Yes, sir.

13

Q

She has testified that this box is hers that has her|

6

14

name on it?

15

A

Yes, sir.

16

Q

And yet when the officer first asked you whose

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
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property is in the back, you said it is all mine?
A

It is my stuff, yes.

Q

And you were lying to the officer, it was Nicole

Ayer's stuff?
MR. DAINES: You don't have to answer that.

I have

no further questions, your Honor.
MR. GRAVIS: Nothing further.
THE COURT: You may stand down.

Mr. Gravis.

MR. GRAVIS: I have no further witnesses, your Honor
16U

1

The Defense rests.

2

THE COURT: Thank you.

3

MR. DAINES: No, your Honor.

4

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Daines, anything further'

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
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20
21
22
23
24
25
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Addendum B

A

No.

Q

But he didn't volunteer any information?
MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, I am going to object.

This

is improper questioning.
THE COURT: On what basis?
MR. GRAVIS: You can't use his silence as evidence.
MR. DAINES: Your Honor, I have never heard of that.
There is a United States Supreme Court decision called Doyle
vs. Ohio that says you can't use silence after Miranda
warning.

But they are not nearly to that point.
MR. GRAVIS: There is also case law that says you

can't use a Defendant's silence pre-Miranda
THE COURT: The objection is overruled.

You may

proceed.
MR. DAINES: Thank you, your Honor.
Q

Did you then--where did you go after he showed you

where his storage shed was?
A

Well, as he stopped and showed me where it was,

another individual come walking out of the storage unit that
was-Q

How far from you was this other individual?

A

About four or five units down.

Q

And we are talking about in a hallway with

approximately what number of these little storage units?
A

Oh, Geez, 75 or a hundred on each side.
2

Q

This is a big building?

A

Yeah, a big building.

Q

So you were about five storage units away, and

somebody comes out?
A

Uh-huh.

Q

How--and put me about where five storage units from

you would be.
A

Can I make it with this wall, or--

It is probably--I would estimate probably about thi^

distance.
Q

All right.

And you have indicated that it was diml}|

A

Yes.

Q

At the time that this person came out, did he look

lit?

at you?
A

Yeah, he came out and kind of--I don't know, he

appeared not startled, but a little surprised.
MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, I am going to object as
calling for conclusions on the part of the witness.
Q

Just describe what he did.
THE COURT: That is--that objection is sustained.

That is stricken.

The answer that he gave of being startled,

the conclusion, that is stricken.

That's not within his

prerogative to make that conclusion.
Ask your next question, Mr. Daines.
Q

Just describe what you saw him do.
2^

A

I saw him come out of the storage unit.

And he was

carrying some books.
Q

What did he then do?

A

He then just kind of--he just stopped.

Q

Okay.

A

Not at that point.

Q

What did you do at this point?

A

At this point I asked him--I asked him what he was

Did he do anything after he stopped?

doing, what they were doing.
Q

Well, did that guy remain there?

A

He--when he came out and saw me, he kind of went

like this and then started to go back into the storage unit.
I said, no, wait.

I said come here, I says, you know, I need

to talk to you.
Q
there.

Now, you have indicated it was dimly lighted in
Was there enough light that at this distance he shoulc|

have seen your uniform?
MR. GRAVIS: Objection, your Honor.

It calls for

speculation.
MR. DAINES: Your Honor, all speculation isnft
objectionable.

Speculation based on information that is

available to a layman through his own sense and through his
own experience is not objectionable.
THE COURT: Okay.

The objection is sustained.

You

may ask the question in his opinion, because a layman can give!
29

an opinion of that distance.

But not whether or not that

individual-Q

In your opinion could he have--should he have seen

your police uniform?
A

In my opinion, yes.

And it was on.

I had my flashlight with me.

And we were at a distance where, you know, I

easily recognized him.
8

Q

All right.

9

A

Correct.

10

Q

What did you say at that point?

11

A

I says come here, I need to talk to you.

12

Q

And did he come back at that point?

13

A

Yes, he did.

Q

So you are now in there with two of these people?

A

That's correct.

Q

Is that correct?

A

Yes, it is.

Q

All right.

A

At this point we--we--I had them come back out.

14
15
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Now he started back into the shed?

What then did you ask these two people?
I

had them follow me out of the storage units so--I felt a
little uncomfortable being in there in that situation with
two--the two people.
out.

And I asked them to come--step back

I knew there was another offi cer that was—that's

usually general protocol, another officer responds in a
situation like this.

Before I did any further investigation
2

or anything, we went back out and waited for the other office^
to arrive.
Q

So you are now back outdoors?

A

Correct.

Q

Is it still light now, if you remember, Officer.

A

Yes, it was.

Q

Okay.

What did you ask them once you got them

outside?
A

Let me refer to my report here.
MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, before he responds, I want

to object to what he asked them.

Mr. Daines can ask what he

asked Mr. Dittmer and what Mr. Dittmer responded.
MR. DAINES: I don't think that's correct, your
Honor.

I think-THE COURT: The objection is overruled.

Daines can ask him what statements he made.

He can--Mr

You may have

raised your objection-Q

What question did you ask them at that time?

A

I asked them at that time if they had been going

through storage units someone else was renting.
Q

And this question was directed at both of them?

A

That is correct, yes.

Q

Did one of the two answer at this time?

A

Yes.

Q

Which one answered?
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A

The Defendant did.

Q

What did he say to you?

A

He said they were going through unlocked storage

units trying to find stuff they could take to the swap meet.
Q

To the swap meet.

And so he indicated to you at

that time that they had been entering units?
A

Correct.

Q

What--after he told you that, what did you ask him?

A

I asked him what they had found.

Q

Now who was this question directed to?

A

At that time I was speaking with the Defendant.

Q

Were you looking at him at that time?

A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

Who responded to the question what did you

find?
MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, I am renewing my objection.
This is not proper testimony.

The Defendant's silence is not

admissible.
THE COURT: Overruled at this point.

Answer the

question.
A

Robert, the other individual stated that they-MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, I will object to what Robert)

had to say too.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. DAINES: May I respond to that?
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THE COURT: We are going to get through one
objection, then we are going to move to the next objection.
MR. DAINES: All right.
THE COURT: The objection is overruled, and he may
answer what he--what question he asked.
MR. GRAVIS: He has already done that.
THE COURT: No, you objected before that.

So now let]

me get--ask that question.
Q

Who-THE COURT: Ask whatever question you want.

Q

Okay.

What my next question was, who then responded}

to the question posed to this Defendant?
THE COURT: Yes, you may answer that.
A

Okay.

Robert.

Q

What did he say, would be my next question.
MR. GRAVIS: Objection, your Honor, hearsay.
MR. DAINES: I would submit it is not hearsay because!

it is not offered for the truth of the matter asserted.

It is)

offered simply to show that that statement was made in the
presence of the Defendant.

So that the Defendant would have

heard it.
THE COURT: Mr. Gravis?
MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, it is hearsay on the part of|
a co-defendant who is not called as a witness, is not
subjected to cross-examination.

Furthermore, it is not — his
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silence again as I have stated is not admissible.
MR. DAINES: First of all, it is.
not asking for his silence.
person said.

But secondly, I anj

I am asking for what this other

This is not a confession.

And this is not--

which is what he is referring to when he says it is not
admissible against him.

And it is admissible.

And it is

relevant because it shows what this Defendant heard in the
presence of the officer, which would then lead to some other
things the Defendant said.
It is not offered for the truth of the matter asserted.
THE COURT: Thank you.
MR. DAINES: Thank you.
THE COURT: This is--this is an area of the law where)
we have what we call hearsay.

And we do not allow hearsay

evidence in because they are statements of people outside the
court because they cannot be cross-examined and for some other]
reasons.

However, there are exceptions.

to allow the answer to this question.

The Court is going

But I am going to tell

you that it is not being admitted for the truth.

It is just

for purposes of showing what--how the investigation proceeded.
The objection is overruled.

You may answer the question.

But to the Jury, it is not--the question--the answer is
not going to whether or not--it does not matter whether or not]
the answer is true or not true.

It is a matter of how the

investigation was proceeding.
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MR. DAINES: Thank you, your Honor.
Q

What did Robert Amador say?

A

He stated they had found a couch, a washer and a

truck shell.
Q

Did he tell you where the couch was?

A

On top of the truck.

Q

Did--had you in fact seen the couch on top of the

truck?
A

Yes, I had.

Q

Now, did the Defendant tell you how the couch got orj

to the truck?
A

No, he didn't.

Q

He did not, all right.

After Robert Amador told yoi^

about the shell, the washer and the couch, did the Defendant
say anything?
A

Yes, he did.

He said that the washer and the shell

were in his storage unit.
Q

In his storage unit?

A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

Had--did anyone else arrive at this time as

you were outside?
A

While I was outside speaking with them Sergeant

Stephens then arrived for backup.
Q

Did you then have a conversation with the Defendant

about something unrelated to specifically the property that
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you had found him with?
A

Yeah, I talked with him about several things. I

asked him how long he had been there, you know.

He stated

that he had been there three or four times that day.
Q

Did he tell you how many truck loads he had taken

out of there?
A

I recall he said that he had been there moving stuf^

three or four different times that day, not how many truck
loads.
Q

You didn't get that specific with him?

A

Correct.

Q

Did you then get into a conversation with him about

his name?
A

Yes, I did.

Q

What caused you to get into the conversation about

his name?
A

Upon getting his name, and once we got back outside,

we have a standard procedure where we check a person for
driver's licenses and any wants or warrants.
name, nothing came back on the computer.

In running his

There was no record

found.
Q

Does that mean no record of a driver's license?

A

There was nothing.

Q

Under Mike Bradshaw with that birth date?

A

Correct.

There was no record whatsoever.
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Q

Okay.

So what did you do when you found that out?

A

I kind of questioned him very calmly.

if he had a Utah Driver's license.

I asked him

He stated that he had,

which would have shown up on the computer.

I spoke with him ^

little more and told him, you know, I didn't feel that I was
getting the correct information.

And after speaking with him

for a few minutes he said, well, that —
Q

Did he tell you--now let me ask questions at this

point to make sure we don't get into something that won't be
admissible.

Did he tell you at this point what his name was?

A

Yes, he did get--

Q

What did he tell you his name was at that time?

A

He told me his name was Mike Dittmer.

Q

Did he correct the birth date he had earlier given

you also?
A

Yes, he did.

Q

Do you know the new birth date that he gave you?

A

I believe it was 4/10 of "60, or 4/10 of "61.

Q

Something like that?

A

Correct.

Q

But he did correct it?

A

Yes, he did.

Q

All right.

Now is Officer Stephens standing with

you at this time?
A

He is there, yes.
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Q

Did you ask the Defendant where the stuff in the

back of his truck came from?
A

Yes, I did.

Q

Did he tell you where that stuff came from?

A

Yes, he said that they had gone--again, they had

gone through the storage units--in the truck or on it?
Q

In the truck

A

Oh, in the truck?

Q

Inside the truck.

A

He said that--he was talking with Officer or

Sergeant Stephens at that point.

And I heard him say it had

been in there for days.
Q

This is not a conversation you had directly with

A

No.

him?
At this point Sergeant Stephens was kind of

talking with him as I was waiting for the information to come
back off the radio.
Q

All right.

So you heard him say it was his, it had

been in there for days.

But you didn't hear the entirety of

that conversation?
A

No, I did not.

Q

Now, did anyone else arrive in this area at this

point?
A

Yes. During this point a lady in a truck pulled up

on the opposite side of the truck we were standing on. And
3

Sergeant Stephens went over to talk to her and find out if shq
was any way--you know, if she was involved in anything.

What

she was doing there.
Q

Did he then come back and ask the Defendant anything

in your presence?
A

Yes, he did.

Q

What did he ask him?

A

He asked him--he asked him if he had a blue aluminunj

camper shell.
Q

Now the Defendant had previously told you he had a

camper shell on his unit?
A

Correct.

Q

Where did the Defendant say at this point?

A

Let me just refer to my--at that point it was--we

kind of said, you know, it sounds kind of like the one you
found.

And at that point Mike asked if we wanted to see the

washer and the shell that was in his unit.
Q

Okay, but this was after you had brought it up?

A

Correct.

Q

Now did you call anyone else at this time; anybody

else from your police department?
A

I believe--I don f t know if it was at this time that

Detective--yeah, Detective Bryson was then notified as to what]
was going on.
Q

And did you then go to a unit that he described as
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his?
A

Yes.

Q

Where was this unit located?

A

It was--the unit that--his unit was located in the

first hallway we had went down, number 665.
Q

All right. And did he open it?

A

Yes, he did.

Q

Were you there when he opened it?

A

Yes, I was.

Q

What was in that unit?

A

All I can recall being in there was the washer and

the shell was kind of--kind of an odd fit.

The shell was kind}

of tipped up over, kind of over the washer.
Q

And did--was Lynnette Talbot with you?

A

Yes.

Q

What did she say in your presence when the door was

opened and the shell appeared?
A

That was the shell that she was there to pick up.

Q

Okay.

After you located this property in the

Defendant's unit, did you ask him if there was anything in
his--the back of his truck that he had picked up there, or
words to that effect?
A

Yeah.

He said everything in the truck was his.

Q

All right.

Did he ask you--did he indicate to you

you could look in it?
391

Officer Hackworth where they had found the couch.
A

I don't recall they said where they had at that

point, but I remember that Mr. Dittmer said that they had
found it.
Q

When you got there, did you see--were there any

vehicles that were not marked patrol cars from Roy P.D. there
A

There was.

Q

What was there?

A

It was an older green Ford pickup truck with a

camper shell on it.
Q

Calling your attention to State's P-6, was this it?

A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

Did you notice anything in the back of this

truck?
A

I did.

Q

What did you notice?

A

It was completely full of all types of miscellaneous)

merchandise, furniture pieces, pictures, boxes, electronic
items, all kinds of things.
Q

All right.

Did--were they asked in your presence

who the property in the back of the green pickup belonged to?
A

Yes.

Q

Did anyone answer that question?

A

Yes.

Q

Who answered that question?
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A

Mr. Dittmer.

Q

And what did he say?

A

He said that the things that were in the back of th^

truck were his.

That all the things in the back of his truck

were his,
Q

And you specifically recall his saying all?

A

I do.

Q

Okay.

Did the Defendant say how long those things

had been in the back of his pickup?
A

He said for a long time.

Q

In the presence of the Defendant and you, did Amadoij

tell you anything about the property in the back of the truck?
MR. GRAVIS: Objection, our Honor.
here to testify.

It is hearsay.

Mr. Amador is not)

And it is clearly

objectionable, it is clearly inadmissible.
THE COURT: Mr. Daines?
MR. DAINES: I am not going to argue too strenuously
that it isn't.

But it might not be offered for the truth of

the matter asserted.

And I could make a proffer out of it.

THE COURT: I think in this case it is sustained.
MR. DAINES: That's fine, I am not going to argue toc|
strenuously I should get that in.
Q

In the presence--but you did have a conversation

with Amador similar to the conversation that you had with the
Defendant?
80
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work?
A

I am sorry.

Q

You don't know if it worked or didn't work?

A

I don't.

5

MR. GRAVIS: Nothing further.

6
7

MR. DAINES: I have nothing further of this witness,
your Honor.

8
9

THE COURT: You may stand down.

May this witness be

excused?

10

MR. DAINES: Yes.

11

MR. GRAVIS: No objection.

12

THE COURT: Thank you.

13

MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, before the State calls

14
15
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another witness, I have a Motion to make.
THE COURT: Thank you.
members of the Jury.

We are going to excuse the

We have one matter I am going to hear a

Motion outside of your presence.

If you will please go with

the Bailiff.
(Jury retired from the courtroom.)
THE COURT: Mr. Gravis.
MR. GRAVIS: Yes, your Honor.
At this time I move for a mistrial on the basis of the
Court's allowing the State to present the Defendant's prearrest, pre-Miranda silence in the case in chief.

As I stated

before, there was a case in Utah that's on point.

I do have a
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copy of the case.

It is State of Utah vs. Palmer, that

specifically says it is not admissible in their case in chief
If the Defendant takes the stand and the testimony is
inconsistent with his pre-Miranda, pre-arrest silence, then itj
is admissible for impeachment purposes.
stand.

He hasn't taken the

The State put it on in its case in chief.

Therefore

it is improper.
Furthermore, your Honor, on top of that, the State
bolstered the credibility of this last witness without his
testimony being impeached.

Therefore in State vs. Perez,

which Mr. Daines is well aware of, prohibits the State from
doing that.

Until I impeach a witness, or attempt to impeach

a witness, he can't bolster his testimony.

You allowed him td

do that by saying is this stuff in your police report, because)
I had impeached the prior witness with statements in the
police report.

I had not even questioned this witness, let

alone tried to impeach him.

Therefore it is improper for the

State to do that.
THE COURT: Thank you.

The State?

MR. DAINES: In response to the first one, your
Honor, I asked the one question, when you went by the shed did
he say anything to you.

Silence is after questioning.

not testify to any questioning.

I simply asked the question,

did he say anything to you when he walked by the shed.
didn f t.

He did]

No, he|

What the silence pre-Miranda and post-Miranda cases,
1001

and particularly Doyle vs. Ohio are talking about are
questioning and then silence.
asked.

And there were no questions

I simply asked the question did he say anything as yoij

went around there.

Silence presumes a question.

On the second one, your Honor, they are way overreading
the Perez decision on that.

When you ask an officer if he

created a police report with what he just said, that's not
bolstering the credibility of the witness, that's just asking
him to state a specific fact.
But furthermore, your Honor will note that I kept asking
the officer did they say anything to you.
anything to them.
kept objecting.

I was using the plural pronoun.

about his police report.

And then I asked him specifically
Did you write he or them in your

He said I wrote the plural.

written singular, or words to that effect.
was relevant.

Mr. Gravi^

Then I would say to him who said that. And

he would say Mr. Dittmer.

police report.

Did you say

I should have
So that's why that|

And that's not bolstering the credibility of a

police officer I would submit by simply asking him if he
created a police report, and if he put that in it.
MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, I-THE COURT: Go ahead.
MR. GRAVIS: I would submit that the State is asking
basically for testimony, if it is consistent with the report,
prior to asking him about the they and them part.

I do agree
10H

Mr. Daines did that.

But Mr. Daines in his opening statement,]

and in his prior testimony that I objected to, has brought up
about when--that they asked Mr. Dittmer a question about what
they had found.

And that Mr. Amador answered.

to Mr. Amador's testimony as improper.

And I objecte4

And I believe Mr.

Daines argued well--right when I made the first objection it
is admissible to show that Mr. Dittmer heard the answer and
didn't respond.
MR. DAINES: No, I didn't say--I didn't say anything
about whether he responded.
MR. GRAVIS: I let you speak, it is my turn totspeak
But, your Honor, he did indicate that it was admissible
to show basically--their argument was to show the Defendant's
state of mind, that he didn't answer the question, that
somebody else did.

So it is a question he was silent on it.

I objected to it on this basis, and in the opening statement,
and I objected to it during the testimony about it.

And it is(

clearly similar to the Palmer situation.
THE COURT: I want you to identify for me, Mr.
Gravis, Mr. Daines is talking about one area of the silence,
and you appear to be referring to another area of the silence.
MR. GRAVIS: I am referring to two areas of silence.
The State has put on whether he was asked any questions when
he walked past the storage shed about what was in the storage
shed is clearly irrelevant.

If he wasn't asked any questions,
1021

his silence as to why he didn't s a y anything should n o t b e
admissible.

M r . Daines h a s brought that in t o show that--a

g u i l t y mind.
Bi 11 moi e :i mpoi tai 111 y t: 1 ie other part i s - -1hey brought u p
here in t h e opening--I asked them :i f they wer e going through
the storage units that someone else rented.

Mike said they

were g o i n g t h r o u g 1: i u n i t s 11 I a t w e i e i i o t ] o c k e ci 11 y i n g !:: o £ :i i l
stuff t o take t o t h e swap m e e t .
found.

I asked them what they h a d

A n d then Robert answered they h a d found a couch, a

I '1 le c ouc '1 l w a s : i i tc j: • c: f I Ii ke " s t] i i

truck shelj.

THE COURT: B u t that isn't--that w a s admitted--that
w a s admitted as t o hearsay rule.

A n d y o u a r e claiming because)

M i k e answered it, the Defendant-MR. G R A V I S : Robert answered.
T H E COURT: I m e a n Robert answered.

A n d M r . Dittmer

did n o t answer it, that somehow that's t h e silence and--I
don't g e t t h e connection.
MR. G R A V I S : M r . Daines went to great p o i n t s t o make
sure t h e Jury knows t h e question w a s asked to Mike and Robert
answered

he is trying t o u s e t h e D e f e n d a n t ' s silence

in h i s case

chief to show the guilty mind.

MR. D A I N E S : M a y I respond t o that?
THE COURT: No.
t h e f i r s t : motd oi :i

Mr. Gravis.

T h e Court is denying t h e m o t i o n o n

i i id I 1 la « e i: lot t a k e n a 1; c ok a t til l a t

Y o u s a y it is directly o n p o i n t ,

case,

1 will look at
1031

the facts of it and allow you at some further time to renew
your motion.

But at this point it is denied.

As to the second point--as to the second point that was
raised, the bolstering, that's your conclusion.
the Court's conclusion.

That's not

The motion is denied.

Your next witness, Mr. Daines, is ready?
MR. DAINES: We are ready, yes.
THE COURT: Bring the Jury back in.
(Jury returned to the courtroom.)
THE COURT: Would you make--do you want me--I will
get copies of it if you will let me have that.
The Jury is present.

Thank you.

Mr. Daines, you may proceed.

MR. DAINES: Thank you, your Honor.

At this time we

will call Officer Tim Jensen to the stand.
TIM JENSEN
called as a witness, and having been first duly sworn, was
examined and testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. DAINES:
Q

State your name and occupation, please.

A

Tim Jensen, police officer, Roy City.

Q

And were you employed by Roy City on the 2nd of

April, 1997?
A

Yes, I was.

Q

What is your primary duty with Roy City?
1041

Addendum C

Q

So what you have is a standard looking out storage

shed, a i 1 :i t: II: i€ i i ::: • i 1 1 1 lii i n s :i d e , si i: ia "1 1 e r ::: • i ie s t: 1 Ia t: a i: e
building?
A
Q

Yes.
• What kii id of doors do tl le inside storage sheds have?)

A

They got like sliding doors.

They just lift up.

Q

And can you lock them?

A

Yes.

Q

Where does the lock go on the storage shed doors?

A

They got like a little latch where it latches up anc|

it goes into the wall.
Q

Okay. So on the 29th, you had two storage sheds

there and you rented from Mollerup?
A

Yes.

Q

When you were at Mollerup did you see anything

unusu .

le premises?

A

Yes.

Q

What did you see?

A

I see i i t: ,/ ::> i i: i e i i 1 1 i a t: w e r e - - o n e o f t: 1 i a i i i « a s ] :i

suspicious.

He was anxious and he kept looking out,

there inside the small ones.

He was

And they were going through the

of them.
Q

All right.

What were they doing after they would gc|

through the storage units?
41

A

One of them was like a lookout.

And the other one

was like pulling stuff out.
Q

Did you see where they were putting things?

A

They were putting them in a truck.

Q

What color was the truck?

A

It was like an older truck.

It was like a faded

greenish color.
Q

All right.

Calling your attention to what has been

marked Statefs Proposed Exhibit number 6, does that look like
the truck?
A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

Now at the--did you ever see, while you were

there, the truck drive away?
A

No.

Q

All right.

A

It was parked in--by one of the doors where you go

Where was the truck parked?

inside the units, the small units.
Q

How many doors--if you have a unit in one of those

doors, is that the only way you can get to your unit?
A

No, there is more.

There is like two on the other

side and two on that side,
Q

So you can get to all of the interior storage sheds

through any of the doors?
A

Yes.

Q

Is that correct?
9

A

Yes.

Q

All right.

After you had seen them, lui' many

storage sheds did you see them go through?
A

Two

three.

Q

After \

: seen them go through these--were you

actually in the building to see them doing that?
A

V

our unit.

wife. And we went to check on

And my wife told me to get out and see, you know,

because we had our units broken into too.

So I went in to

see, you know, because they were like suspicious.

So I went

in to go see what was going on just with the one that we
owned.

And there was like two or three that were already

opened.
Q

You didn't see either of these two guys actually

break into a shed?
A

No.

Q

Now other than the property in the sheds themselves,

in th

closets or the sheds or however large these are--and

about how large are they, Mr. Solomon?
A

They are not that large.

Q

jive us some idea?

A

Probably as big as a bathroom.

Q

A bathroom?

.-. A .
Q

Yeal i, ] i ke the normal bathroom.
Okay.

Other than the property in the open shed, the
6

three open sheds that you had seen-A

Uh-huh.

Q

Was there any other property scattered around in th^

hallways at that time?
A

I seen a couch pulled out, that was sort of halfway

Q

So the only property you saw, other than what was ir(

out.

the storage sheds, was a couch partially pulled out of a
storage shed?
A

Yes.

Q

There wasn!t a lot of other property loose in the

area?
A

No.

Q

All right.

Would you remember what the couch lookec|

like if you were to see it?
A

No.

It was dark?

A

It was dark?

A

In the units there.

Q

Did those people see you?

A

Yeah, one of them seen me. And he was just like

looking out, you know.
Q

And you could see them?

A

Yeah.

Q

Now, did you see them well enough to recognize them

if you were to see them again?

1

A

Yes.

2

Q

Do you see either of the two individuals JI

3

today?

4

'A

5
6

Which--where is that person?
A

7
8

11

D,A INESr All right.

THE COURT: It may so indicate.
Q

Which

t

tic two individuals was he?

13

truck.

14

Q

Was looking out?

15

A

Yeah.

16

and looking.

17

suspicious, me and my wife.

20
ft

21
22
23
24
25

Was he the one|

by the truck or the one t h a t —
A

19

1 lay the record show the

Defendant has been identified by the witness, your Honor?

12

18

2

He is sitting right here.
MR

9
10

».u«

No, he was the one that was putting stuff in the
The other one was looking out.

And he kept coming out of the little units

He would pop back in.

Q

All right.

A

Yes.

Q

Now, how long have you rented at Mollerup?

A

For

Q

During the peric. ... r time tl lat y o u, 1 la * e r ented

abOUL

Did you call the police?

a

yea'

there, have you become acquainted with Mollerup's procedures
whei I s smebod? .« :i s overdue on the r ent, or abandoned the shed?
A

Yes.
8[

Q

What does Mollerup do to those sheds?
MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, may I voir dire the witness?]
THE COURT: You may.
MR. GRAVIS: How are you familiar with those

procedures?
A

Because we have--we are overdue on our unit.

When

you are overdue on a unit, they put a lock on it.
MR. GRAVIS: Okay.

So you know what happens when yoi^

are overdue?
A
Q

Yes.
(By Mr. Daines) They put a lock on it?

A

Yes.

Q

So the Jury understands, once you are overdue, if

they are going to move you out of the unit or if you--they
actually--your lock is already on it?
A

Yes.

Q

And then an extra Mollerup lock goes on there?

A

Yes.

Q

That's what your experience has been there?

A

Yes.

Q

And yet the units that you saw the Defendant going

through were not locked?
A

No.

Q

Do you know the numbers of any of the units that you|

saw them going through?

A

No.

Q

All right

A

Yes.

Q

Did you see either the Defendant or the other persorj

But you did see a couch pulled partway

out?

by the couch when you saw them?
A

Yes, they were just going througn and coming out of

the little one and going back out, you know.
Q

Okay.

see by

couch?

A

I seen the other guy.

Q

The other guy?

A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

A

Yes. We first got the license plate number off the

Now did you then call the police?

truck.
Q

All right.

A

And we pulled out and parked by the main office,

which is on the other side of the fence.

And I goi

- . 11>

wife stayed in the car, locked the doors, t<i> make sure they
didn't leave.

If they left, you know, she would let me know.

I went through a fie.
Q
A • '

Q

larmon•

.

Did a police officer arrive?
Yes.

Di d you give the police officer the information that]

you have just told the Jury?
101

A

Yes.

Q

After you gave him that information, what did the

officer ask you to do?
A

They asked us to wait on the other side of the

fence.
Q

Did you ever see these people again?

A

No.

Q

Do you remember, Mr. Le Doux, how much property was

in the back of the green pickup?
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

back

A

It was full.

Q

Full?

A

That's right.

Q

Did you see anybody actually put property in the

o f the green truck?
A

I seen a person put some up on top of the truck.

Q

On top of a truck?

A

Yeah, on top of the camper?

Q

Okay.

A

No.

Q

All right.

A

Yes.

You didn't see the rest of it go in?

Was it already there when you arrived?

MR. DAINES: Nothing further.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Gravis.
MR. GRAVIS: Thank you, your Honor.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
111

BY MR. GRA\ .
Q

Okay, Mr. Le Doux, this truck was already there wher]

you arrived?
A

Yes.

' .'

Q

And what time did you arrive?

A

Probably like around 6:00, 6:30, between there.

Q

And you went to your storage shed outside first, is

that correct?
A

Yes.

Q

What did you do in your storage shed outside?

A

Make sure that it wasn't opened.

whe.

Because we went--

...ad our first storage sheci broke into, they didn't let)

us know that it was broken into.

So we just had to go and it

was opened and everything was taken out.
Q

• When d:i i that occur? •

A

Probably a week after that?

Q

That occurred a week prior to this?

A

Yes.

Q

So you had had a storage shed broken into?

A

Yes.

Q

Was it in Mollerup?

A

It was

Q

Okay.

It was the same.
So you checked your outside storage unit.

How long did that take?
A

We just passed by to make sure the lock was still onj
12

it.
Q

Okay.

Then you stopped and actually went in and

checked your inside one?
A

See, that's the thing, we--we--when they first were

broken into, they didn't clean it out.

The people that owned

Mollerup, they didn't let us know that our unit was broken
into.

So my wife told me to get out and see if stuff was

still in there, what was left, like a bunch of papers, albums
you know
Q

So you went in?

A

So I just went in.

My wife told me to go in and see)

what was going on.
Q

So you went in and checked yourself?

How long were

you inside there?
A

Probably like two minutes.

Q

Okay.

So how long--then you left and went to

Harmon's, is that correct?
A

I went to the outside and parked by the main office.

Q

Okay.

Then you went to Harmon's.

From the time you|

initially saw the truck until the police officer arrived, how
much time had passed?
A

I'd say like 15 minutes.

Q

Okay.

These people had seen you when you went in

and checked the unit?
A

Yes.
131

Q

Did you talk to them?
No.
Bi it 1 i :: c ] o s e

::i :i • ::i } • ::: i i ::: : n: i = t ::: them?

The little unit is right next to ours.

The ones

that are outside, it is right across the street from our
storage unit.
MR. GRAVIS: Okay

1 have nothing further.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. DAINES:
Q
I

Mr. Le Doux, did you ever say to either one of them

going f u go I'MU the police?
A
Q

No.
Did you ever say to either one of them do you belong)

in these units?
A
Q
A
Q

No.
Did you have any conversation with them?
No.
So there was no apparent reason why they should pay

any attention to you?
A
Q

No.
Now, you are acquainted with Mollerup?

You have

testified that there are garages, standard storage garages in
the interior portion wi I li I IIH tiht> l y ,
around this entire thing of some kind?

1 «., t l u i r

.1 M MI i t y

The entire--all of the]

storage sheds.
141

A

A fence.

Q

How do you get through the fence?

A

You have got to punch in a code, and the fence open^

Q

In order to get access to Mollerup, you have to hav^

up.

a code?
A

You have to have a code.

Q

Who has the code in order to get in?

A

The people that own the storage sheds.
MR. DAINES: Okay, thank you.

I have nothing

further, Mr. Gravis.
RECROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. GRAVIS:
Q

So you have got to have a code to get in.

If you

take your stuff out of Mollerup do they change the code after
you take your stuff out?
A

Yes, they should.

our stuff out.

I don't know.

We haven't taken

But that's the way it usually is, I guess.

Q

So they have got a different code for everybody?

A

Yes, they got a different code for everyone.

Q

Okay.

Now, was there anybody else in Mollerup when

you pulled in there?
A

There was a lady that rents right next to ours that

was there.
Q

Okay.

Anyone else?
151

A

No.

Q

Was she there when you got there?

A

Yes.

Q

Wrtlfi

A

Yes.

f'il'lM'1 1 I"!*'1 1 *'* 1 ' 'tlf-MI

" / O H ! | P f t "?

MR. GRAVIS: Nothing further.
•.

1 1R

DAINES : Notl lii ig f ill t :her , } :: m

He >i lor.

'

THE COURT: Y o u m a y stand down.
Ladies and Gentlemen, w e are going to take the lunch
could have } : i i back here, we \ :i ] 3

b r e a k at this time.

commence at 1:30, if y o u will b e back at that time.

If y o u

get here early and want to g o back into the Jury room, the
B a i l i f f — locate the Bailiff..

T h e B a i l i f f will help y o u do

that.
A g a i n I remind you, don't--you just heard o p e n i n g
s t a t e m e n t s and the testimony of o n e w i t n e s s .

Don't make u p

y o u r m i n d about what happened until y o u hear all of the
evidence

I> ::: i i"' t: discuss the case wi th anyone . A i i :i we will

see y o u b a c k here at 1:30.
Court will b e in r e c e s s .
(Noon i ecess takei :i )
THE COURT: This is the case of State vs. Dittmer
The record will indicate the parties are present, the members
present.
witness.

ML

'

(State of Utah vs. Michael
selected and sworn.

Dittmer

Case called.

Jury

Preliminary Ins;i . - . .

Opening statement by Mr. Daines.

Opening reserved by Mr.

Gravis.)

THE COURT
MP
Mr.

all _. . ..:• f

>*: witness.

DAINES: Thank you, your Honor.

We would call

Solomon Le Doux to the stand.
SOLOMON LE DOUX

called a, s a ,

:i t:i ie, =;s

and having been first duly sworn, was

examined and testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR

DAINES:
Q

State your name, please, sir.

A

My name is Solomon Le Doux.

Q

Mr. Le Doux, calling your dLtention

2 9th of

March, 1997, did you have a storage shed that you rented at
that time?
19

A

Yes.

20

Q

Where was the storage shed rented- -I mean located?

21

A

The trailer was 103 and

22

Q

Okay.

23

A

N o , w e h a d •.-•• o f t h e m .

24

Q

Where was tat; other one located? •

25

A

The other was a smaller one, and it was inside.

* was an out side one.

Is that the < : • i i] y

.

t

1 ia<:! at: 11 i, • 11 i : i m e ?

Q

So what you have is a standard looking out storage

shed, and then on the inside, smaller ones that are in a
building?
A

Yes.

Q

What kind of doors do the inside storage sheds have?)

A

They got like sliding doors.

Q

And can you lock them?

A

Yes.

Q

Where does the lock go on the storage shed doors?

A

They got like a little latch where it latches up anc|

They just lift up.

it goes into the wall.
Q

Okay. So on the 29th, you had two storage sheds

there and you rented from Mollerup?
A

Yes.

Q

When you were at Mollerup did you see anything

unusual going on on the premises?
A

Yes.

Q

What did you see?

A

I seen two men that were--one of them was like

suspicious.

He was anxious and he kept looking out.

there inside the small ones.
storage units.

He was

And they were going through the

Like I seen them go through like two or three

of them.
Q

All right.

What were they doing after they would gc|

through the storage units?
41

A

"

was like a 1 • :>okoi it.

And the other one

was like pulling stuff out.
Q

Did \-

see where they were putting things?

A

T.. . -."

Q

What color was the truck?

A

It was like an older truck.

k.

It was like a faded

greenish color.
Q

All right.

Calling your attention to what has been

marked State's Proposed Exhibit number 6, does that look like
the truck?
A

Yes.

Q

Oka:;,

Now at the--did you ever see, while you were

there, the truck drive away?
A

No.

Q

All right:

A

It was parked in--by one of the doors where you go

Where was the truck parked?

inside the units, the small units.
Q

• H c •> w in a i" i. y d o o r s - - i f }r o i i 1 I ai; e a i 11 :i :i t: :i i i • : n e of tho

doors, is that the only way you can get to your unit?
A
side c
Q

N o , there is more.

There is like two on the other

.hat side.
So you can get to all of the interior storage sheds

through any of the doors?
A
Q

Is that correct?
g

A

Yes.

Q

All right.

After you had seen them, how many

storage sheds did you see them go through?
A

Two or three.

Q

After you had seen them go through these--were you

actually in the building to see them doing that?
A

Well, I was with my wife. And we went to check on

our unit.

And my wife told me to get out and see, you know,

because we had our units broken into too.

So I went in to

see, you know, because they were like suspicious.

So I went

in to go see what was going on just with the one that we
owned.

And there was like two or three that were already

opened.
Q

You didn't see either of these two guys actually

break into a shed?
A

No.

Q

Now other than the property in the sheds themselves,

in the closets or the sheds or however large these are--and
about how large are they, Mr. Solomon?
A

They are not that large.

Q

Can you give us some idea?

A

Probably as big as a bathroom.

Q

A bathroom?

A

Yeah, like the normal bathroom.

Q

Okay.

Other than the property in the open shed, the!

three open sheds that you had seen-A

Uh-huh.

Q

Was there any other property scattered around in th^

hallways at that time?
A

I seen a couch pul^ea out, that was sort of halfway

out.
Q

\ property you saw, other than what was ir}

the storage sheds, was a couch partially pulled out of a
storage shed?
'.A-.'...

Y <-

Q

There wasn't a lot of other property loose in the

A

No.

Q

All right.

area?

Would you remember what the couch lookedj

like if you were to see it?
A

No.

It was dark?

A

It was dark?

A

In the units there.

Q

Did those people see you?

A

Yeah, one of them seen me

And he was just like

r

ooking

ou know.

Q.

<,. . you c^nld PPP Miem?

A

Yeah.

Q

'

enough t ::> recognize them

if you were to see them again?
71

A

Yes,

Q

Do you see either of the two individuals in court

today?
A

Yes.

Q

Which--where is that person?

A

He is sitting right here.
MR. DAINES: All right.

May the record show the

Defendant has been identified by the witness, your Honor?
THE COURT: It may so indicate.
Q

Which of the two individuals was he?

Was he the one)

by the truck or the one that-A
truck.

No, he was the one that was putting stuff in the
The other one was looking out.

Q

Was looking out?

A

Yeah.

and looking.

And he kept coming out of the little units

He would pop back in.

So that's how come we got)

suspicious, me and my wife.
Q

All right.

Did you call the police?

A

Yes.

Q

Now, how long have you rented at Mollerup?

A

For about a year.

Q

During the period of time that you have rented

there, have you become acquainted with Mollerup's procedures
when somebody is overdue on the rent, or abandoned the shed?
A

Yes.
8|

Q

What does Mollerup do to those sheds?
MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, may I voir dire the witness?
THE COURT: You may.
MR. GRAVIS: How are you familiar with those

procedures?
A

Because we have--we are overdue on our unit.

When

you are overdue on a unit, they put a lock on it.
MR. GRAVIS: Okay.

So you know what happens when yo\-|

are overdue?
A
Q

Yes.
(By Mr. Dames) They put a lock on it?

A

Yes.

Q

So the Jury understands, once you are overdue, if

they are going to move you out of the unit or if you--they
actually--your lock is already on it?
A

Yes.

Q

And then an extra Mollerup lock goes on there?

A

Yes.

Q

That's what your experience has been there?

A

Yes.

Q

And yet the units that you saw the Defendant going

through were not locked?
A

No.

Q

Do you know the numbers of any of the units that you[

saw them going through?
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A

No.

Q

All right.

A

Yes.

Q

Did you see either the Defendant or the other persorj

But you did see a couch pulled partway

out?

by the couch when you saw them?
A

Yes, they were just going through 'and coming out of

the little one and going back out, you know.
Q

Okay.

Who did you see by the couch?

A

I seen the other guy.

Q

The other guy?

A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

A

Yes. We first got the license plate number off the

Now did you then call the police?

truck.
Q

All right.

A

And we pulled out and parked by the main office,

which is on the other side of the fence.

And I got out. My

wife stayed in the car, locked the doors, to make sure they
didn't leave.

If they left, you know, she would let me know.

I went through a field to Harmon's and called the cops.
Q

Did a police officer arrive?

A

Yes.

Q

Did you give the police officer the information that]

you have just told the Jury?
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A

Yes.

Q

After you gave him that information, what did the

officer ask you to do?
A

They asked us to wait on the other side of the

fence.
Q

Did you ever see these people again?

A

No.

Q

Do you remember, Mr. Le Doux, how much property was

in the back of the green pickup?
A

It was full.

Q

Full?

A

Thatfs right.

Q

Did you see anybody actually put property in the

back of the green truck?
A

I seen a person put some up on top of the truck.

Q

On top of a truck?

A

Yeah, on top of the camper?

Q

Okay.

A

No.

Q

All right.

A

Yes.

You didn't see the rest of it go in?

Was it already there when you arrived?

MR. DAINES: Nothing further.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Gravis.
MR. GRAVIS: Thank you, your Honor.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
13J

BY MR. GRAVIS:
Q

Okay, Mr. Le Doux, this truck was already there wher

you arrived?
4

A

Yes.

5

Q

And what time did you arrive?

6

A

Probably like around 6:00, 6:30, between there.

7

Q

And you went to your storage shed outside first, is

that correct?
A

Yes.

Q

What did you do in your storage shed outside?

A

Make sure that it wasn't opened.

Because we went--

when we had our first storage shed broke into, they didn't let
us know that it was broken into.

So we just had to go and it

was opened and everything was taken out.
15

Q

When did that occur?

16

A

Probably a week after that?

17

Q

That occurred a week prior to this?

18

A

Yes.

19

Q

So you had had a storage shed broken into?

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

Was it in Mollerup?

22

A

It was.

23

Q

Okay.

It was the same.

So you checked your outside storage unit.

How long did that take?
A

We just passed by to make sure the lock was still oi
i;

it.
Q

Okay.

Then you stopped and actually went in and

checked your inside one?
See, that!s the thing, we--we--when they first were

A

broken into, they didn't clean it out.

The people that owned

Mollerup, they didn't let us know that our unit was broken
into.

So my wife told me to get out and see if stuff was

still in there, what was left, like a bunch of papers, albums
you know
Q

So you went in?

A

So I just went in.

My wife told me to go in and see)

what was going on.
Q

So you went in and checked yourself?

How long were

you inside there?
A

Probably like two minutes.

Q

Okay.

So how long--then you left and went to

Harmon's, is that correct?
A

I went to the outside and parked by the main office

Q

Okay.

Then you went to Harmon's.

From the time you|

initially saw the truck until the police officer arrived, how
much time had passed?
A

I'd say like 15 minutes.

Q

Okay.

These people had seen you when you went in

and checked the unit?
A

Yes.
131

Q

Did you talk to them?

A

No.

Q

But how close did you come to them?

A

The little unit is right next to ours.

The ones

that are outside, it is right across the street from our
storage unit.
MR. GRAVIS: Okay.

I have nothing further.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. DAINES:
Q

Mr. Le Doux, did you ever say to either one of them

I am going to go call the police?
A

No.

Q

Did you ever say to either one of them do you belongj

in these units?
A

No.

Q

Did you have any conversation with them?

A

No.

Q

So there was no apparent reason why they should pay

any attention to you?
A

No.

Q

Now, you are acquainted with Mollerup?

You have

testified that there are garages, standard storage garages in
the interior portion with the sheds.
around this entire thing of some kind?

Is there a security
The entire--all of the)

storage sheds.
141

A

A fence.

Q

How do you get through the fence?

A

You have got to punch in a code, and the fence open^

Q

In order to get access to Mollerup, you have to hav^

up.

a code?
A

You have to have a code.

Q

Who has the code in order to get in?

A

The people that own the storage sheds.
MR. DAINES: Okay, thank you.

I have nothing

further, Mr. Gravis.
RECROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. GRAVIS:
Q

So you have got to have a code to get in.

If you

take your stuff out of Mollerup do they change the code after
you take your stuff out?
A

Yes, they should.

our stuff out.

I don!t know.

We haven't taken

But that's the way it usually is, I guess.

Q

So they have got a different code for everybody?

A

Yes, they got a different code for everyone.

Q

Okay.

Now, was there anybody else in Mollerup when

you pulled in there?
A

There was a lady that rents right next to ours that

was there.
Q

Okay.

Anyone else?
151

A

No.

Q

Was she there when you got there?

A

Yes.

Q

Was she there when you left?

A

Yes.
MR. GRAVIS: Nothing further.
MR. DAINES: Nothing further, your Honor.
THE COURT: You may stand down.

Ladies and Gentlemen, we are going to take the lunch
break at this time.

If we could have you back here, we will

commence at 1:30, if you will be back at that time.

If you

get here early and want to go back into the Jury room, the
Bailiff--locate the Bailiff.

The Bailiff will help you do

that.
Again I remind you, don't--you just heard opening
statements and the testimony of one witness.

Don't make up

your mind about what happened until you hear all of the
evidence.

Don't discuss the case with anyone.

And we will

see you back here at 1:30.
Court will be in recess.
(Noon recess taken.)
THE COURT: This is the case of State vs. Dittmer.
The record will indicate the parties are present, the members
of the Jury are present.

Mr. Daines, you may call your next

witness.
16

Addendum D

1

Detective Anita Bryson to the stand.

2
3

THE COURT: Thank you.
please.

4

ANITA BRYSON

5

called as a witness, and having been first duly sworn, was

6

examined and testified as follows:

7

DIRECT EXAMINATION

8

BY MR. DAINES.

9

Q

State your name and occupation, please.

10

A

I am Anita Bryson.

11
12
13

I am a Detective with the Roy

Police Department.
Q

How long have you been a detective with the Roy-

Police Department?

14

A

About a year.

15

Q

How long have you been a police officer with the Roy(

16
17
18
19
IK
6

If you would come forward,

20
21
22
23
24
25

City Police Department?
A

A little better than eleven years.

Q

On the 29th of March, 1997, in what division were

you assigned?
A

The Detective Division.

Q

Did you have any specific jobs in the Detective

Division?
A

Yes, I primarily investigate property crimes.

Q

And did you get a call on the 29th of March, 1997,

at about 6:30 to come to work?
12U

A

Yes, I did.

Q

Were you working that day?

A

No.

Q

You were the on call detective?

A

Yes, that's correct.

Q

Where did you go?

A

I was asked to go to Mollerup, or Security Mini

Storage.
Q

And what do you call it?

A

I call it Mollerup.

Q

All right.

A

Yes, that's true.

Q

The address is what, please?

A

1701 West Riverdale Road, Roy.

Q

When you arrived were there any other officers from

But we are talking about the same place

here?

your department there?
A

Yes.

I met Detective--excuse me, Sgt. Stephens and

Officer Hackworth.
Q

Now what was your primary position at the time that

you arrived?
A

What were you going to be doing that night?

I was there to assist Officer Hackworth with his

investigation, and to interview, if it needed to be done, any
suspects.
Q

So your job was to interview suspects?
1221
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3
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5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

A

Thatf s correct.

Q

And--all right.

And did you interview--two people

were arrested there that day, is that correct?
A

Thatf s correct.

Q

Did you interview either one of them?

A

Yes, I did.

Q

Okay.

I interviewed both.

And in what order did you interview these

people?
A
Amador.
Q

I initially ordered--excuse me, interviewed Robert
And then I interviewed Michael Dittmer.
All right.

And did you take a statement from Robert)

Amador?

13

MR. GRAVIS: Objection, your Honor, it is irrelevant

14

THE COURT: You can answer yes or no.

15

MR. DAINES: That's all I am asking.

16

A

Yes, I did.

Q

Okay.

17

Was that before or after the one you took

18

from Dittmer?
19

A

Before.

Q

Did you then take a statement from the Defendant?

A

Yes.

Q

Prior to the time that you took a statement, did you|

20
21
22
23

advise him of his rights under the Miranda decision?
24

A

Yes, I did.

Q

Did you do so from memory, or from a card that you

25

123I

carry?
A

Well, when I do an interview in my office, I have a

card taped to my computer monitor that I read directly from,
which is right near where they sit.
Q

Did you--is that a proper rendition of Miranda?

A

Yes, it comes from the State law.

Q

Did you give those warnings to the Defendant?

A

Yes, I did.

Q

Can you now tell the Jury what warnings you gave

A

You wish me to read the entire warning?

Q

Do you have them with you?

A

No.

Q

Well, I wish you to go over the warnings you gave

A

I advised him he had the right to remain silent. If|

him?

him.

he gave up the right to remain silent, anything he said could
and would be used against him in a court of law.

That he has

a right to an attorney and have an attorney present with him
before questioning if he wished one.

If he decided to answer

questions without having counsel present, he could stop
answering questions at any time or request an attorney at any
time.

And then I asked if he understood the questions.

Q

What was his response?

A

He said yes, he understood it.
124

1
2
3

Did you ask him having those rights in mind would hq

be willing to speak to you
A

Yes.

Q

He agreed?

5

A

Yes.

6

Q

Did you then question him?

7

A

Yes, I did.

8

Q

Where did you question him?

9

A

In my office.

10

Q

And that's at the Roy Police?

11

A

Thatf s correct.

12

Q

Was there anyone present at the time that you

4

13
14
15
16
17
18
?

1
s

19

a.

20

'i

Q

21
22
23
24
25

He agreed.

questioned him?
A

No, there was not.

Q

All right.

At the time that you questioned him, did(

he tell you if he had been at Mollerup earlier in the day?
A

Yes, he did.

Q

When did he tell you he had been there?

A

He told me that he had been there at 9:30 or 10:00

ofclock in the morning that morning.
Q

All right.

Did he indicate what, if anything, he

saw there?
A

He said that in the afternoon he told Mr. Amador

that he had seen a couch at Mollerup.

And that--and suggested]

to him that they go to Mollerup and get it.
1251

Q

Did he tell you what they did after they got the

couch?
A

He said that after they got the couch they looked

through other storage sheds that were not locked for other
property.
Q

That were not locked?

A

That's correct•

Q

That was his criteria for getting property?

A

Yes.

Q

Any shed that wasn't locked?

A

That's correct.

Q

All right.

Did he indicate whether anybody came by

while he was there?
A

Yes, he did.

He said that the manager of Mollerup

had come by and had looked in and did see him.
Q

Did you verify that through your own investigation

if the manager from Mollerup had come by?
A

I verified he had been there at the scene.

I don't

know if he had been there prior to the police being there.
Q

Okay.

He was there when the police were there?

A

Yes, that's right.

Q

All right. What did he say about the stuff that he

had entered or put in his truck?

Did he tell you what he

thought it was?
A

He thought that most of it was--he said he thought
12£

it was garbage.

It was just going to be going in the garbage.]

Stuff going in the garbage.
Q

Did you see the stuff in the truck?

A

I did.

Q

Did you see the things in the partially opened shed

of Ms. Ayers?
A

Yes, I did.

Q

Did that look like garbage headed to the garbage

A

No, it did not.

Q

Were you present when he opened his shed?

A

Yes, I was.

Q

Did you see what was in his shed?

A

I did.

Q

What was in there?

A

A blue camper shell, a white washing machine, and

heap?

there were some other objects in there.
Q

Did you look at the washing machine?

A

I did.

Q

What can you tell the Jury about the washing

machine?
A
machine.

It was very clean.

There was no scratches on the

I know my own washing machine at home is not very

old, works pretty well, and it doesn't look that good.
Q

You didn't plug it in, though?
1271

1

A

No, I didn't.

Q

All right.

2
3
4

to at that time?
A

No, I did not.

Q

Did you subsequently learn who that washing machine

5
6
7

Did you have any idea who that belonged

belonged to?
A

I did.

Q

How long after the 29th of March was it before--

8
9

MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, I am going to object to

10

this.

n

and when she discovered it is irrelevant.

12

with theft of a washing machine.

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

22
23
24
25

This is irrelevant who the washing machine belongs to
He is not charged

THE COURT: Well, I don't know what he is charged
with theft of.
MR. DAINES: No, he is not charged with the theft of
the washing machine.

It is not in there, your Honor.

He is

not charged with that.
THE COURT: Tell me the relevance.
MR. DAINES: The relevance of asking about the
washing machine?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. DAINES: Because he said that to her in his
statement, that the material was junk.
THE COURT: And you are talking about-MR. DAINES: It looked to him as if it was going to
1281

the garbage.

And I am asking her if it looked to her like it

was going to the garbage.
THE COURT: You may proceed.
Q

All right.

Did you--after he told you that that

stuff was going to the garbage did you specifically ask him
about that washing machine?
A

Yes, I did.

Q

Why did you pick the washing machine?

A

It looked to be more--one of the more valuable or

newer items.

I also didn't know who it belonged to at that

point.
Q

What did he tell you about the washing machine?

A

I asked him if he honestly thought that washing

machine was going in the garbage.

And he said no.

He himself]

said in his heart he knew it was wrong to take it and that he
should return it.
Q

Okay.

Did you ask him about any of the other

property, other than the washing machine?
A

Specificly items, I don't recall asking him, no.

Q

Okay.

And was that basically the total of the

conversation that you had with him at that time?
A

Basically, yes.
MR. DAINES: Okay.

I have no further questions.

THE COURT: Mr. Gravis.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
1291

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

BY MR. GRAVIS:
Q

Lynnette Talbot had indicated that she and another individual
would come and clean out abandoned storage sheds, correct?
A

interview.
Q

And that she specifically would buy the item^

A

I am not sure I understand.

Q

That she--her statement earlier to Officer--I

believe it was Officer Hackworth.
MR. DAINES: Whose statement are we talking about?
MR. GRAVIS: Lynnette Talbot's.

15

MR. DAINES: I object to that as being hearsay, your
Honor.

17

19

Okay.

that were left in the storage shed, correct?

14

18

I think I was aware that she did that at that time.

But I am not positive whether it was before or after the

13

16

Now when you questioned him, you are aware that

MR. GRAVIS: Well, your Honor, Mr. Daines has put in
lots of hearsay of Ms. Talbot.

I was of the understanding she)

was going to testify.

20

MR. DAINES: Your Honor, there was no indication of

21
that.

And I am going to object.

That's not an answer to a

22
hearsay objection.
23
MR. GRAVIS: Well, your Honor, I am not--she said she)
24
was conducting the interview.

I am asking what she was aware

25
of when she conducted the interview.
13 d

THE COURT: Okay.

Set up the question again.

Will

you do that?
Q

Okay.

When you questioned him, were you aware she

had indicated-THE COURT: When you questioned-MR. GRAVIS: Mr. Dittmer.
THE COURT: Okay.
Q

Were you aware Ms. Talbot indicated that she would

clean out abandoned storage sheds and buy the items left ther^
from the owner?
A

I was never aware that she bought them.

I was told

that she was given them-Q

Okay, or given them.

A

Or give the items away.

Q

Mr. Dittmer always indicated the storage sheds were

She never bought them.

open when he got there, right?
A

Yes.

Q

Were you aware that there were previous burglaries

at that Mollerup storage area that week prior?
A

I knew there were some previous ones.

I didn't

know-Q

Okay.

You don't know anything about previous ones?

A

Exactly how previous.

Q

Okay.

There have been others there,

yes.
Now when you talked to him, he indicated-13U

always indicated that these storage sheds were already opened,]
that he didn't break into them, correct?
A

Uh-huh.

Q

And that he thought the property had been abandoned

because they were wide open?
A

I don't know whether he is indicating that he think^

the property is abandoned.
sheds that are open.

He is telling me that he finds

And that he thinks that they must be

going to go to the garbage.

And that's when I asked him do

you really think that stuff is going to the garbage.
Q

That he thought the stuff was going to the garbage?

A

Yeah.

Q

Because this was wide open?

A

Because the sheds were open.

Q

Okay.

That's how that came up.

Now as far as the washing machine goes, you

don't know whether that was in working condition, though,
right?
A

I don't.

Q

You just looked at the outside of it.

Did you go up]

and closely examine it?
A

No.

Q

So it may have been junk after all, as far as you

A

As far as I know.

Q

Do you know whether it had a motor in it or not?

know?

1321

1
2
3
4

A

I did try to look behind it, and I didn't--it felt

heavy enough it probably had a motor.

I would guess it did.

But I didn't examine it for a motor.
Q

Okay.

Now did you--when you went through his right^

5

with him, and you recited them in court.

6

bring up the part about advising him of his right to have an

7

attorney appointed if he could not afford one.

8
9
10
11

A

14
15
16
17

I am sure--I am a

hundred percent positive it is on the card I read to him.
Q

You did read it from a card?

A

Yes, I did.

12
13

I may have missed it today.

I didn f t hear you

MR. GRAVIS: Okay.

I have nothing further.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. DAINES:
Q

When Mr. Gravis characterizes the sheds and says--as|

wide open, has he been saying the sheds were wide open or
unlocked?

18
A

Unlocked.

19
MR. DAINES: Thank you.

Nothing further.

20
THE COURT: Mr. Gravis.
21
MR. GRAVIS: Nothing further.
22
THE COURT: You may step down, thank you.

Mr.

23
Daines.
24
MR. DAINES: Your Honor, at this time the State would)
25
move for entry of P-13.
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1
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2
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3
4
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5
6
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BE IT REMEMBERED that the above entitled matter came on

11
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12
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13
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MR. DAINES: Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, this
is the time that the State has the opportunity to give an
opening statement.

Before I actually get into the facts of

the case, I should caution you on a few things about Jury
trials, for those of you who have never been in one before.
For those who have, you probably already know this, hopefully
And I wish I would have said this before they were excluded a^
witnesses.

Hopefully the witnesses that the State have as

witnesses will avoid you like the plague during the course of
this trial, in the elevators and the street, at lunch time.
Many of the restaurants are quite close to the courthouse, so
you might see somebody walk in the door and turn around and
walk back out if they see you sitting there.
That isn't because they don't like you.

It is simply

because they can't have any contact with Jurors, shouldn't
have any contact with Jurors.

Most people who have at least

been through this process try to avoid at least the appearance)
of some improper contact with Jurors.
don't like you.

It is not that they

It is what they should be doing.

And

probably you should be doing the same thing if you see them
after they have been introduced.
The State has the opportunity to give you an opening
statement.

As Judge Baldwin has instructed you, the defense

may or may not give an opening statement.
an opening statement.

Nobody has to give

Nobody has to give a closing statement
2|
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At the end of the trial, I will be given the opportunity
to provide what is called a summation.

The defense here agair}

will also have the right to provide a summation.

After the

defense has gone through their summation, I get a rebuttal.
After I finish with the rebuttal, the defense doesn't get to
talk any more.

Now, the reason for that is, as Judge Baldwin

has instructed you, the burden of proof is on the State.

And

for that reason, the party with the burden of proof in the lav}
suit always speaks last.

That's the reason for that.

not taking unfair advantage of anybody.
proof,

and

We are

We have the burden o£|

that's the way--that's why it goes

that

way.

On the 25th of March, 1997, a young woman by the name of
Nicole Ayers had visited her storage unit.

Her storage unit

was number 552 in an establishment known as Mollerup Storage
at 1701 West Riverdale Road in Riverdale.

This, for those of

you who don't know about this place, and perhaps none of you
do, I didn't, is the standard type of storage area with the
bay garages that you can pull a car or boat or something like
that into.
It also has a large building that has hallways with
interior storage, storage--smaller storage rooms that

also

22
have garage types of doors in them.

And it is into this--and

23
the Judge will instruct you that breaking into a building, or
24
any portion of a building, is burglary.
25
of a building.

And this is a portioi^

The Defendant, on the--during this period of time had
access to that building because he had a storage locker in
there like Nicole Ayers did.
into the building.

So the unlawful entry is not

The unlawful entry is into the portion of

the building which was controlled on the 25th and 29th of
March by Nicole Ayers, and had been locked by her at that
time.
She is not certain exactly why she was there now on the
25th of March.

She was not living in her own home.

living with a relative.

She was

So all of her worldly belongings, her)

furniture and appliances and books and teddy bears and things
like that that she had collected were in this storage shed.
And she also had some clothes there.

I think her best

recollection is I might have been there on the 25th of March
in order to pick up some clothes.
She was keeping a key lock on the storage shed.
went in there on the 25th of March.
She got in there.

And she

She unlocked the key.

She did whatever business she had to do,

and she noticed that all of her things were intact.

Nothing

was missing from her storage shed on the 25th of March, 1997.
When she left, she was very careful to put her key lock
on the shed, check it to make sure that her shed in the
interior part of the building of Mollerup Storage was secure.
Her testimony will be in fact it was secure.

I am very

careful about locking those things up, and I am sure I locked

it on that day.

She then left and went about her business.

Nicole Ayers did not know this Defendant, who is seated
here at counsel table.
On the 29th of March at about 5:45, or even earlier in
the evening, a gentleman by the name of Solomon Le Doux, who
was also a renter at Mollerup Storage, had gone to Mollerup
Storage.

While he was there, he noticed that on the east sid^

of the storage rows inside the building there were two guys
who had parked an old green pickup truck outside of one of thej
doors, who were going into various sheds taking property and
putting it in the truck.
Mr. Le Doux did--they appeared to be taking property fronj
people that these people have no right to, so he immediately
called the police.

At about 6:00 p.m. Officer Stuart

Hackworth arrived, dispatched in response to Mr. Le Doux's
call.

Officer Hackworth is a young officer who was assigned

to the patrol division at that time. And he was in uniform
and in a marked car of the Roy City Police Department.
He contacted Mr. Le Doux.

Mr. Le Doux said they are

around there on the other side.

Officer Hackworth then asked

Mr. Le Doux, don't approach the area, you stay here and I will
go see whatfs going on.

Officer Hackworth then approached,

here again in the evening hours.
the 29th of March.

It is still light.

This is

And when he went around the corner, he

found this Defendant standing by a pickup truck that was

completely loaded with property, and had a couch strapped on
the top of it.
He walked over to this person and said is this your truck
to the Defendant.

The Defendant said yes, it is. And he said

what's your name to the Defendant.

And the Defendant, who yoij

know by Michael Dittmer obviously from Judge Baldwin's having
read the Information, told him at this time my name is Mike
Bradshaw.

Officer Hackworth said what is your birth date?

And the Defendant said 4/10/64, April 10, 1964.

In fact his

birth date is April 10, 1961.
At that time, because he had been told by Mr. Le Doux
that more than one person was there, and he could only see the)
Defendant, he said do you have somebody else here with you?
He is in the storage shed.

The truck is parked outside one o^

the two doors on the side of the building that you can see in
the photo that leads down to these rows of storage sheds. Ancj
it is parked outside of one of those rows.
Is there anybody in there?
there?

Robert, Robert Amador.

said what are you doing here?

Yeah, there is. Who is in
He is in the shed.

Hackworth

And he said we are going

through unlocked sheds and taking the property of people to
sell at the swap meet.
are going through.
this place?
in here.

But they are unlocked sheds that we

Hackworth said okay, do you have a shed in)

And at this time he said yes, I do.

It is right

Now as you will see from

a photograph

and hear

from

the

officers--he then took Hackworth into the building.

There ar^

two doors.

And he

One door leads to the Defendant's shed.

showed that to Hackworth.

The other door is actually in a

hallway where Nicole Ayers1 shed is.

They are in two

different hallways as I understand the setup there.
outside the one for Nicole.

He is

He does tell the officer there i4

a shed there, and he points it out to him.

He says that's

mine.
The door is down at this time.

other information
fact

to the officer

that that's my shed.

And he volunteers no

at this

time,

other

than

the

And like I say, his door is down,

and they can't see anything.
At this time Hackworth, because he is in the building,
all of the sudden sees Amador with an armful of books poke his)
head out of an open shed, and then poke right back in. At
this time he says who is that?
Amador to come out too.

That's Amador.

And he orders

So Amador comes out of a shed within

the building which is open.
And he is then in there with both of these individuals,
and has called for a backup, or at least knows that his
dispatch knows where he is. And he is in kind of an empty
area at this time.

Remember, it is a Saturday evening.

It isj

getting along towards dark, and he has got two guys on his
hands.

So he has asked for a backup to come.

And Sergeant
7t

Dan Stephens is on his way at this time.
Because he had been addressing the Defendant, Hackworth
at this time said to the Defendant what have you guys found?
Now, he has seen the truck.
property.
truck.

He has seen the truck full of

He has noticed the couch strapped on top of the

At this time, though the question was directed at the

Defendant, Amador answers.

And Amador says--

MR. GRAVIS: I would object to whatever Amador says.
Amador is not included as a witness by the State, and
therefore any statements by Mr. Amador is clearly hearsay.
MR. DAINES: No, they are not, your Honor.

They are

statements made in the presence of the Defendant at the time
that-MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, I am-MR. DAINES: Responding to the question.

They are

not hearsay.
THE COURT: This is not--this is not evidence.
instruct you this is not evidence.

I

I am going to allow you tc|

proceed.
MR. GRAVIS: May we approach the Bench first, your
Honor?
THE COURT: Uh-huh, please.
(Conference at Bench with Court and counsel.)
MR. DAINES: At this time, though the question was
directed at the Defendant, Amador answered and said a couch, al
8)

camper shell and a washer.
At or about this time Dan Stephens rolled in.

And so

that Dan Stephens is now present, along with Officer
Hackworth, with these two people.
After Robert has told them this--and by the way, the
officers cannot see--they see the couch on top of the truck.
They cannot see a camper shell. And they cannot see a washer
at this point.
At this time the Defendant was asked by one of the
officers where did all those items in the back of your pickup
truck come from, because all he has been told about right now
is a camper shell, a washer and a couch.

He hasn't been told

about all of this property in the back of the truck.

And at

this time the Defendant responded that all of the items in the)
back of his pickup came--belonged to him.

That they had been

there for, in his words at that time, a long time.
At this point Amador, who was with them, standing right
with the Defendant, he can hear what the Defendant said, he
said that's right, those items belong to Dittmer, and they
have been in there for days, is the terminology he used.
And so right off the bat the officers are told that
though the couch on the top of the truck might belong to
someone else, the interior property, the things in the
inside--the first statement the Defendant made to the
officers, the things inside belong to this Defendant.

1
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At this point a woman by the name of Lynette Talbot drovq
up while the four of them were standing there.

Came in there

and said I am looking for a blue camper shell that had been
given to me because I helped clean out some sheds here.

And

I can't see it anywhere.
At this point Dan Stephens, who had been told that the
Defendant had a shell in his storage shed, walked over to her,

8

got a description, walked to the Defendant and said is it a

9

blue camper shell that you have in your storage shed?

At thi^

10

time the Defendant said would you like to see?

11

yes, we would.

12

his storage shed for the officers.

13

was Lynette Talbot's blue camper shell, a washer, and one of

14

the pieces of property--no, a washer and a camper shell.

15

that was the only property in that storage shed.

16

nothing else.

17
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And he said

So they went over, and the Defendant opened
Inside the storage shed

The officers looked at the washer.

Ancj

There was

The testimony will bej

from them that it was quite a new appearing washer.

It is not]

something that looks like scrap material.
At this time, because of the fact that property which
they now know belongs to another person had been found in
their possession, Hackworth goes to this Defendant and point
blank says to him, is there any property in your truck that
you have found around here that we should know about?

And the)

Defendant said here, after being asked by the officer about
10I

the property in the back of the truck, I will open it for you
So they went over to the truck, and he opened the truck.
The first thing inside the truck was a box.

And the box,]

it is difficult to see in the exhibit, but Nicole Ayers will
show you where her name is on the cardboard box.

At this tim^

she was renting, like I say, shed number 552.
Officer Stephens said the box lid was open.

He simply

reached in and found a day planner type of thing within the
box.

And looked in it, and there was Nicole Ayers' name and

telephone number.
Stephens looked at the Defendant and said did you find
this around here?

And the Defendant said yes.

Detective--or

Sgt. Stephens' statement will be this is the first time in hi^
presence that the Defendant has acknowledged that there is
property in the back of that truck that doesn't belong to him.
Previously he had said to Stephens all of that property in
there is mine.
So the police called the number.
uncle, I believe.
place of work.

Had to call through an

And finally reached Nicole Ayers at her

And they said to her do you have a storage

shed at Mollerup?

Yes, I do, number 552.

at 552, and said your shed is open.
here and look at the property.
She arrived.

The officer looked

Will you please come down|

So she came down.

The Defendant and Amador are still there.

She looked at the couch on the roof and said that's my couch
111

on the roof of that pickup truck.

That was in my shed that

was locked a few days ago, the 25th of March, by my key.

And

that is my couch.
So they said well, peek in the truck and see if you can
see anything else in there.

She looked in there, and she saw

various items of her property in back of the truck, including
a blue bed frame and some other articles which she will
identify.
She also noted, after having looked in her shed, that
there were things missing from her shed that were neither in
the shed nor in the truck at that time.
She at that time--after she had identified property that
the Defendant had previously said belonged to him, the
officers arrested the Defendant.

He was taken to the police

department, and Detective Bryson, who was the detective callec|
out on the case that Saturday night, who had been at the
scene, she arrived after Stephens did, had actually been there)
when they looked in the shed, spoke to the Defendant, after
having given him his Miranda warnings, and said what were you
doing there?

The Defendant said, hey, we are just there

cleaning out the sheds. The people abandoned the sheds. We
didn't think that property was worth anything.
just going in the garbage anyway.

It was all

And Officer Bryson said

where are you getting this property?

Well, we were going intc)

the sheds, but the doors were unlocked.

He admitted at this
121

time that he had gone into the sheds.

She said come on,

Dittmer, you have seen that washing machine in your shed.

Did

you really think they were going to throw that washing machinq
away?

And he said no, I don't think they were going to throw

the washing machine away.

I shouldn't have taken that.

Now, at that time he knew that the police knew who the
property belonged to in the back of the truck, and on top of
the truck, that it belonged to Nicole Ayers.

But she had no

idea at the time who this washing machine belonged to.

So sh^

used that as an example of come on, you don't think any of
that is going out, do you?

And he admitted no, maybe I

should take that piece of property back.
Before the Defendant was taken to the police department
to speak to Detective Bryson, while he was still in
Hackworth's car, patrol car, before he was transported, Sgt.
Stephens and another officer who was there, and a CSI officer,
a crime scene investigator, began doing an impound inventory
of the truck that was parked there.

On the seat in plain

view, while he was doing the inventory, Officer Stephens--Sgt
Stephens found what is known to him, based on twenty I think
one years, or almost twenty years of experience as a police
officer, something he would call a hype kit.

And what that is)

is equipment in a kit used to shoot up controlled substances.
And he picked it up off the seat and held it up where the
Defendant could see it.

He was over in Hackworth's car.

The
131

Defendant said that's mine.

I have a drug problem.

When he was searched after he was arrested by Officer
Hackworth, Marijuana was found in his pants pocket.
Those are the facts that comprise the four charges that
are before you as the Jury today.
Thank you for listening.
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Daines.

Mr. Gravis?

MR. GRAVIS: Reserve opening statement, your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you.
• ••

Call your first witness.
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